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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Priority No. 2 
v. : 
JEFFERY SCOTT WORTHINGTON, : Case No. 970668-CA 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals a final order of dismissal in a prosecution for one count of 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) (1996 & Supp. 1997), and one count of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37a-5(l) (1996). 
These counts were dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the trial court's 
order suppressing evidence which rendered the State unable to proceed. See State v. 
Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993). The State's appeal is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 
77-18a-l(2)(a) (1995 &, Supp. 1997). 
1 
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND PRESERVED ON APPEAL, 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err as a matter of law in determining that the police 
interview in defendant's home amounted to custodial interrogation for purposes of 
Miranda! 
"Because the determination of custody for Miranda purposes is fact 
sensitive, [this Court] accordfs] a measure of discretion to the trial court's determination 
unless such determination exceeds established legal boundaries." State v. Strausberg9 895 
P.2d 831, 835 n.5 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922,929 (Utah 
App. 1994)). 
This issue was preserved by the parties' arguments below (R. 36-50 (motion 
to suppress and memorandum), R. 62 (motion for reconsideration), R. 123-128 
(prosecutor's oral argument)), and by the trial court's ruling on the merits (R. 57-61). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), issue in this case raises no 
constitutional, statutory or rule question. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two drug offenses: possession of 
2 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor (R. 1). Defendant moved to suppress statements he made to an officer in 
defendant's home (R. 36-50) (a copy of the motion and supporting memorandum is 
attached as addendum A), and the trial court granted the motion, finding that defendant 
was subjected to custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda (R. 59-60) (complete 
copy of the trial court's decision is attached as addendum B). The trial court also denied 
the State's motion for reconsideration, asking the trial court to reverse its decision based 
on State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996) (R. 68) (a copy of the trial court's denial 
is also contained in addendum B). Because the State was unable to proceed without the 
suppressed statements, the trial court dismissed with prejudice the above charges (R. 75). 
The State filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 77-78). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On 6 January 1997, Deputy Kim Sorensen of the Sevier County Sheriffs 
Office received a call from the manager of a local manufacturing plant. The manager 
reported that drugs had been found inside an employee restroom at the plant (R. 89). 
Deputy Sorensen visited the plant and received from the manager a white cardboard box, 
approximately two by three inches and about one inch deep, which contained a small 
amount of white powdery substance, a razor blade, a short piece of straw and a mirror (R. 
1
 A complete copy of the transcript of suppression hearing, held on 12 
August 1997, is contained in addendum D. 
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90). The powdery substance in the box field tested positive for methamphetamine (id.). 
Additionally, the name "Scott" was handwritten inside the lid of the box 
(id). Because defendant was the only employee with the name Scott, and because 
defendant had just worked the night shift at the plant, the deputy continued his 
investigation by visiting defendant at his home (R. 91). 
Deputy Sorensen was greeted at the door of defendant's home by 
defendant's small son (R. 92), Shortly thereafter, defendant's wife came to the door (id.). 
She confirmed that defendant was at home and stated that he was then resting on the 
couch (id.). When Deputy Sorensen asked to speak to defendant, Mrs. Worthington led 
the deputy into the front room and offered him a chair (id.). The deputy observed that 
defendant was "laying on the couch. It did look like he had either been sleeping or he 
was trying to . . . He had just gotten off the graveyard shift so he hadn't been there too 
long" (id). Deputy Sorensen asked defendant if he could talk to him "for a few minutes" 
and defendant said, "Yes" (id.). Defendant's wife and son were in and out of the front 
room throughout the deputy's conversation with defendant (R. 93,110). 
The deputy informed defendant that a box with his name on it had been 
found at the plant and that he was there to see if the box in fact belonged to defendant, or 
if defendant had any information regarding the box (R. 102).2 When the deputy asked 
2
 Deputy Sorensen was unable to recall whether he also told defendant the 
substance inside the box was methamphetamine (R. 102). 
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defendant if had ever seen the box before, defendant said, "No" (R. 93). The deputy then 
asked defendant if he was familiar with the inscription inside the lid of the box, and 
defendant acknowledged that he was (id). The deputy asked defendant if he was also 
familiar with the contents of the box and defendant said, "No" (R. 94). When the deputy 
said he would name the items inside the box for defendant's benefit, defendant admitted 
recognizing the box and claimed that he had loaned it to his sister "and that she [had had] 
it for a while" (R. 94-95). Defendant said that "he was supposed to have returned [the 
box] to her and he had it in his pocket" (id.). Defendant admitted leaving the box at the 
plant (R. 95). 
Based on these admissions, Deputy Sorensen told defendant that he had no 
choice but to place him under arrest (R. 96). Out of consideration for defendant's son, the 
deputy did not handcuff defendant until both men were outside of the home and getting 
into the patrol car (id). The deputy did not read defendant his Miranda rights at that time 
(id.). 
Defendant also testified at the suppression hearing. Defendant said his five 
year old son awakened him "by jumping on him and saying 'Daddy wake up'" (R. 110). 
Defendant realized the deputy was present when he awakened and saw the deputy 
standing in the front room (R. 105). Defendant could not recall whether the deputy 
informed him of the purpose for his visit (R. 105). However, defendant denied that the 
deputy informed him that the substance in the box was methamphetamine (R. 111). 
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According to defendant, he told the deputy that he had never the seen the box before (R. 
105,111). Indeed, defendant denied that he ever 1) acknowledged the box belonged to 
him; 2) recognized the contents of the box:; and 3) stated the box belonged to his sister (R. 
111,114). He further claimed that he told the deputy he did not want to answer 
questions, after the deputy had asked him if he had seen the box before, but before the 
deputy began to show him the contents of the box (R. 108). Up to this point, defendant 
said he freely answered the deputy's questions, as far as he knew, explaining that he 
"went back to sleep" during the interview: "Yes, I fell back asleep. I was sitting on my 
couch" (R. 108-09). 
Ruling on Motion to Suppress. The trial court granted defendant's motion 
to suppress his statements, finding in pertinent part, as follows: 
5. The deputy went to the defendant's home. His 
knock at the door was responded to by a young 
child named Keith. The defendant at that time 
was asleep on the couch. 
6. Mrs. Worthington came to the door. The deputy 
said, "There was an incident that happened at 
the mill and Mr. Worthington is the number one 
suspect. May I speak: with Scott?"3 
3
 Defendant's wife, who is the only witness who testified that the deputy 
made the above statement, did not testify at the suppression hearing, but did testify at the 
preliminary hearing (R. 29) (a complete copy of the transcript of the preliminary hearing 
held on 11 February 1997, is attached as addendum C). The trial court, which also acted 
as the preliminary hearing court, reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript at the 
conclusion of the suppression hearing (R. 131-32). 
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7. Mrs. Worthington admitted the deputy into the 
room where the couch was and provided a chair 
for him to sit on next to the couch. The 
following exchange occurred between the 
deputy and the defendant, who was then sitting 
up on the couch. 
Sorensen: Are you Scott Worthington? 
Defendant: Yes. 
Sorensen: (retrieving a bag out of his pocket 
and showing the little white 
cardboard box) Have you seen 
this before? 
Defendant: (No response.) 
Sorensen: Is the box yours? 
Defendant: (No response.) 
Sorensen: I am going to name for you the 
items that are inside this box. 
Defendant: I have opened the box before and 
I have seen what is inside, but 
after that I put the lid back on and 
put it away. 
(R.58-59),add.B. 
Based on the above findings, the trial court concluded that defendant was 
subjected to custodial interrogation which required Miranda warnings for two reasons: 1) 
he was awakened to find the deputy in his living room, or in the court's words, "in terms 
of defendant's consciousness, it arrived at the place of interrogation from a state of being 
7 
unconscious or asleep to a state of being conscious or awake in the presence of a police 
officer making accusatory statements"; and 2) because M[t]he deputy's attention was 
focused on the defendant before he ever arrived at the defendant's homeM(R. 60), add. B. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's determination that defendant was subjected to custodial 
interrogation which required Miranda warnings inside his own home is incorrect as a 
matter of law. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court incompletely analyzed the 
significance of the home setting of the interview, misapprehended the significance the 
officer's subjective focus on defendant, and completely ignored other relevant factors, 
including the absence of any indicia of arrest, the brief and non-compulsive nature of the 
questioning, and that defendant was not transported anywhere against his will. The trial 
court's ruling suppressing defendant's incriminating statements on the ground that they 
were obtained in violation of Miranda is consequently unsupported by its underlying 
factual findings, as far as they go, and is also inconsistent with pertinent Miranda 
authority. As such, the ruling exceeds legal boundaries and should be overturned. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
IN CONCLUDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
SUBJECTED TO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION IN 
THE PRESENCE OF HIS WIFE AND CHILD AND IN 
THE COMFORT OF HIS OWN HOME 
The critical issue in this case is whether the trial court erred as a matter of 
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law in concluding defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda when he was 
questioned by Deputy Sorensen in his own front room. For reasons set forth in the body 
of this brief, the trial court's conclusion is driven by its failure to adequately analyze, and 
to even consider, all of the factors deemed pertinent to the Miranda custodial 
interrogation analysis. The trial court's custody determination is also inconsistent with, 
and unsupported by its sketchy factual findings, and controlling case authority. It 
therefore "exceeds established legal boundaries" and merits no measure of discretion. 
State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 831, 835 n.5 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 
922,929 (Utah App. 1994). 
Custody Standard Whenever an accused is subjected to custodial 
interrogation, he must be given the benefit of a Miranda warning. State v. Yoder, 935 
P.2d 534, 545 (Utah App. 1997); Strausberg, 895 P.2d at 834. One is in custody for 
purposes of Miranda when his "freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with 
formal arrest." State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144,1146 (Utah 1996) (additional quotations 
omitted); Yoder, 935 P.2d at 545. Whether a person who has not been formally arrested 
is "in custody" for Miranda purposes "depends on an objective assessment of the 
circumstances of the interrogation with respect to the compulsory nature of the 
interrogation rather than on the subjective intent or suspicions of the officers conducting 
the examination." Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147. 
The custody determination is aided by review of five factors: "(1) the site 
9 • 
of interrogation; (2) whether the interrogation focused on the accused; (3) whether the 
objective indicia of arrest were present; [] (4) the length and form of interrogation [;]", id. 
and M(5) whether the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely and willingly." 
State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217,1224 (Utah App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 
943 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Carner9 664 P.2d 1168,1171 (Utah 1983). 
An objective assessment of this case shows that the trial court misapplied 
and/or wholly ignored the above factors in concluding defendant was subjected to 
custodial interrogation. As detailed in part A, infra, the trial court's consideration of the 
site of the interview is incomplete. As detailed in part B, infra, the trial court completely 
misapprehended the focus factor. And, as discussed in parts C-D, infra, the trial court 
completely ignored the remaining custody factors including the facts that defendant was 
not transported anywhere by police, the absence of any indicia of arrest, and the brief, 
non-compulsive nature of the questioning. The trial court's custody determination 
consequently "exceeds established legal boundaries." Straus berg at 835 n.5; Teuscher, 
883 P.2d at 929, and should be overturned. 
A* The Consensual Nature of the Home Interview, 
Conducted in the Presence of Defendant's Wife and Small 
Child, Mitigates Against the Trial Court's Conclusion of 
Custodial Interrogation 
The trial court correctly found that the interview was conducted in 
defendant's front room, and that the deputy's entry was consensual (R. 58-59), add. B. 
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However, the trial court failed to enter additional findings on the undisputed evidence that 
the home interview was conducted by a single officer, in the presence of defendant's wife 
and small child {see R. 92-93,110). The trial court's failure to give adequate 
consideration to the non-compulsive atmosphere of the home setting drives its erroneous 
determination of custodial interrogation (R. 60), add. B. 
First, "[t]he harm that Miranda was to eradicate was the 'incommunicado 
interrogation... in a police dominated atmosphere.'" State v. Davis, 446 N.W.2d 785, 
788 (Iowa 1989) (citation omitted). The comfortable home setting in this case was 
"substantially less police dominated than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at 
issue in Miranda itself." State v. East, 743 P.2d 1211,1212 (Utah 1987) (quoting 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (discussing traffic stop scenario)). Where 
interrogation occurs not in a police station, but in "familiar or at least neutral 
surroundings" like the suspect's home, "courts are much less likely to find the 
circumstances custodial." W. La Fave, Criminal Procedure, § 6.6 p. 496 (1984 & Supp. 
1991). See, e.g., Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 348; United States v. Hurtado, 899 F.2d 371,375 
(5th Cir. 1990), r'hg granted on other grounds, 905 P.2d 74 (5* Cir. 1990); State v. 
Johnson, 699 A.2d 57,65 (Conn. 1997); State v. Marshall, 690 A.2d 1,69 (N.J.), cert, 
denied, 118 S.Ct. 140 (1997); Morris v. State, 557 So.2d 27,28 (Fla. 1990); Mcllwain v. 
United States, 568 A.2d470,473 (D.C. 1989); State v. Bacon, 390 SJE.2d 327,333 (N.C. 
1990); State v. Darby, 556 N.W.2d 311,318-19 (S.D. 1996); State v. Hopfer, 679 N.E.2d 
11 
321,337 (Ohio App. 1996); Davis, 446 N.W.2d at 788 (all holding interrogation in 
suspects' home non-custodial). Here, defendant was so at ease, he testified that he fell 
back to sleep during the interview (R. 108-09). 
Second, Deputy Sorensen's consensual entry, utilizing no coercive or 
compulsive stratagem, also mitigates against the trial court's conclusion of custody. See 
State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385,391 (Utah 1986) (holding that brief questioning inside 
defendant's home did not amount to custodial interrogation where defendant consented to 
officer's entry and there was no evidence officer utilized coercive or compulsive 
stratagem); Strausberg, 895 P.2d at 834 ("The absence of coercive or compulsive strategy 
on the officer's part evidences a noncustodial interrogation that does not suggest the type 
of abuse Miranda is intended to prevent") (citations omitted). See also Bacon, 390 
S.E.2d at 332; Hopfer, 679 N.E.2d at 337 (both affirmatively noting officers' consensual 
entry of suspects' homes). 
Third, the facts that the home interview was conducted by a single officer, 
and in the presence of defendant's wife and small child, similarly belies the trial court's 
conclusion of custody. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 457 P.2d 613, 614 (Utah 1969) 
(deeming it significant that home interview was conducted in presence of suspect's wife 
and friend); People v. Robinson, 177 N.W.2d 234,235 (1970) (affirmatively noting that 
"lone officer" did not "physically dominate" the questioning scene). "[A]t home 
questioning" under such circumstances is generally considered non-custodial, particularly 
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"when the suspect's friends or family members [are] present". W. La Fave, Criminal 
Procedure, § 6.6 p. 496 (1984 & Supp. 1991). See also Archer v. United States, 393 
F.2d 124,125 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Gregory, 891 F.2d 732,735 (9th Cir. 1989); 
People v. Butterfield, 65 Cal. Rptr. 765,768 (Cal. App. 1968); Hopfer, 679 N.E.2d at 
337; Johnson, 699 A.2d at 65-66; Wunder v. State, 705 P.2d 333,335 (Wyo. 1985) (all 
affirmatively noting presence of suspect's family member during police questioning as 
militating against finding of custody). 
While custodial interrogation can occur even in the suspect's home, the trial 
court erred in failing to consider that the above facts, demonstrating a consensual, non-
compulsive atmosphere, sufficiently distinguished this home interview from more 
problematic cases that manifest an air of police dominance and/or compulsion (R. 60), 
add. B. See e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (deeming home interview 
conducted in suspect's bedroom at 4:00 a.m. by four officers, one of whom testified that 
defendant was under arrest, to constitute the equivalent of compulsive, station house 
interrogation); United States v. Longbehn, 850 F.2d 450,453 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding 
custodial interrogation where suspect made to accompany police to his home and submit 
to execution of search warrant by five officers, during which search defendant was 
continuously chaperoned and overtly interrogated by three additional officers); People v. 
O'Hearn, 931 P.2d 1168 (Co. 1997) (defendant subjected to custodial interrogation when 
three uniformed police officers made nonconsensual warrantless entry of her home at 
13 
midnight and told defendant she was not free to leave). 
B. The Absence of Evidence That Defendant was Aware of 
the Deputy's Purported, Subjective Focus Mitigates 
Against the Trial Court's Conclusion of Custodial 
Interrogation 
Regarding the focus factor, the trial court noted only that the deputy's 
attention was focused on defendant before he ever arrived at defendant's home (R. 60), 
add. B. This sparse statement constitutes the trial court's entire consideration of the focus 
factor. On these facts, the trial court's cursory analysis suggests an erroneous 
understanding of the focus factor's application. Mirquet clarifies that an officer's 
unarticulated, subjective focus on a particular suspect is irrelevant to the determination of 
whether the suspect is "in custody" for Miranda purposes. Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1148 
(citing Stansburyv. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994)). Indeed, the United States Supreme 
Court has emphasized that it "was the compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and 
not the strength of content of the government's suspicions at the time the questioning was 
conducted, which led the Court to impose the Miranda requirements with regard to 
custodial questioning." Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341,346-47 (1976) (citations 
omitted). Beckwith therefore rejected police "focus" as a satisfaction of the "in custody" 
requirement for Miranda warnings on the ground that being the focus of a police 
investigation did not equate with being in the "custodial situation described by Miranda", 
that being "incommunicado interrogation... in a police-dominated atmosphere." Id 
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?ost-Beckwith cases from the Supreme Court have been "consistent in adhering to this 
understanding of the custody element of Miranda." Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324 (citing 
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,495 (1977) ("Nor is the requirement of warnings to 
be imposed simply because . . .the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. 
Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's 
freedom as to render him 'in custody.' It was that sort of coercive environment to which 
Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited."); California v. 
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121,1124, n.2 (1983) (noting Beckwith and Mathiason rejected 
"notion that the 'in custody' requirement was satisfied merely because the police 
interviewed a person who was the 'focus' of a criminal investigation"); and Minnesota v. 
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,431 (1984) ("The mere fact that an investigation has focused on a 
suspect does not trigger the need for Miranda warnings in noncustodial settings, and the 
probation officer's knowledge and intent have no bearing on the outcome of this case") 
(citation omitted)). 
Beckwith and progeny thus make clear that in order for the focus factor to 
support the trial court's custody determination in this case, it must be shown that 
defendant was aware of the deputy's purported focus. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324. This 
is so because an officer's "unarticulated suspicions do not affect the objective 
circumstances of an interrogation or interview, and thus cannot affect the Miranda 
custody inquiry." Id. The record is devoid of evidence that defendant was aware of the 
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deputy's subjective focus: moreover, the trial court entered no finding to that effect (R. 
58-59), add. B. 
Here, the record shows only that defendant was the starting point of Deputy 
Sorensen's investigation (R. 91). Significantly, the deputy denied any intent to arrest 
defendant at the time of the interview (R. 95). For all the deputy knew, the box could 
have been stolen, or even belonged to someone else (R. 99). As discussed above, this 
type of investigative focus does not trigger Miranda protections. Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 
347 (distinguishing between "focus" in the "starting point of an investigation" and 
"focus" for Miranda purposes, which occurs only when questioning is initiated by police 
after a suspect has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom). See also 
Kelly, 718 P.2d at 391 (initial investigatory objective of police militates against 
determination of custody). This is particularly true where the officer's focus is not 
communicated to the suspect. Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1148. 
The only arguably contrary evidence is the preliminary hearing testimony of 
defendant's wife, that the deputy told her defendant was the "prime #1 suspect" (R. 29). 
Importantly, there is no indication that defendant overheard the deputy's alleged 
statement to his wife. Further, defendant has never claimed that the deputy told him he 
was the primary suspect, or that he otherwise had cause to believe as much (R. 104-116). 
To the contrary, the weight of the evidence suggests, and the trial court found, that 
defendant was asleep in the front room when the statement to defendant's wife was 
16 
purportedly made (R. 58), add. B. This finding further belies and is inconsistent with the 
trial court's ultimate custody determination (see R. 60), add. B. It illustrates the trial 
court's basic misapprehension of the custody standard, in particular, the focus factor as 
clarified in Mirquet: As long as defendant was unaware of the deputy's subjective focus, 
it is simply "not relevant" to the determination of whether he was in custody for Miranda 
purposes. Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1148. Therefore, the trial court incorrectly concluded the 
deputy's purported, subjective focus was determinative of the custody issue (see R. 60), 
add.B.4 
C. The Absence of Evidence That Defendant was 
Transported Anywhere by Police Against His Will 
Mitigates Against the Trial Court's Conclusion of 
Custodial Interrogation 
The trial court further erred in deeming it significant that defendant and/or 
his "consciousness" awakened to find Deputy Sorensen present in his front room (R. 60), 
add. B. The trial court's reasoning constitutes a misapplication of the fifth custody factor, 
4
 Even if there were an indication in the record that defendant was somehow 
made aware of the deputy's statement to his wife, this home interview would not be 
transformed into a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. As demonstrated 
in Part A, supra, and Parts C-D, infra, the trial court's deficient analysis is unsupported 
by any other factor deemed relevant to the Miranda custodial interrogation analysis. See 
Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325 ("Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under 
interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some 
suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest. The weight 
and pertinence of any communications regarding the officer's degree of suspicion will 
depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case."). 
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whether defendant came to the site of the interrogation freely and voluntarily. Gray, 851 
P.2d at 1224. While defendant may have been surprised to see the deputy when he 
awakened, this fact by itself did not render the meeting custodial. The pertinent and more 
analytically sound inquiry is whether defendant was taken to the place of interrogation by 
police against his will. State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292,297 (Utah App. 1990). See also 
Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 342-343 (rejecting argument that perceived psychological 
restraints11 can constitute the functional equivalent of custody for Miranda purposes). 
Here, defendant, and/or defendant's "consciousness" was not transported anywhere, but 
was simply awakened in the safety and security of his own home (R. 104-05). The State 
is unaware of any case authority supporting the trial court's metaphysical analysis. 
Defendant cited none in his memoranda below (R. 43-46), add. A. The trial court's 
analysis is therefore both unsupported and irrelevant to the custody issue. 
D. The Absence of Any Indicia of Arrest, and the Brief, Non-
compulsive Nature of the Deputy's Questions Mitigate 
Against the Trial Court's Conclusion of Custodial 
Interrogation 
Finally, the trial court wholly failed to enter facts concerning the complete 
absence of any indicia of arrest, and the brief, non-compulsive nature of the interview (R. 
58-60), add. B. Indicia of arrest include "readied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn 
guns." Kelly, 718 P.2d at 391 (citation omitted). While the parties disputed whether or 
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not Miranda rights were given,5 it is uncontested that the deputy did not draw his weapon, 
ready his handcuffs, or lock any door thereby cutting defendant off from his wife and 
child (R. 29-30,104-116), add. C & D. Moreover, as noted previously, the deputy did not 
go to defendant's house with an intent to arrest and never expressed to defendant any 
intention to arrest until after defendant's admissions (R. 96). See Kelly, 718 P.2d at 391 
(affirmatively noting officer entered suspect's home with an "investigatory rather than 
accusatory purpose"); Hopfer, 679 N.E.2d at 337 (affirmatively noting officers never 
expressed any intention to arrest). Even after these admissions, out of consideration for 
defendant's young son, the deputy waited until after the interview, when both men were 
outside the home preparing to depart for the jail, to handcuff defendant (R. 96), add. D. 
The absence of any indicia of arrest mitigates against the trial court's custody conclusion. 
It is further undisputed that the questioning was brief (R. 58-60), add. B. 
Brief questioning in one's home is "quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which 
frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will 
continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek." Berkemer, 468 U.S. 
at 437 (holding that temporary and brief nature of questioning pursuant to a traffic stop 
5
 At the preliminary hearing, defendant's wife claimed that the deputy gave 
defendant Miranda warnings after showing defendant what the box contained, but that 
defendant did not respond to any of the deputy's questions (R. 29), add. C. At the 
suppression hearing, defendant claimed that the deputy read him the Miranda rights after 
asking him "all sorts of questions" (R. 106), add. D. The deputy testified that he did not 
give defendant Miranda rights either before or after effecting the arrest (R. 96), add. D. 
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did not constitute custody for Miranda purposes). Defendant himself testified that the 
interview lasted only five minutes (R. 116). The brevity of this home interview similarly 
mitigates against the trial court's determination of custody. Compare Kelly, 718 P.2d at 
391 (upholding in-home interview which lasted only "minutes") and Longbehn, 850 F.2d 
at 451 (finding custodial interrogation occurred, noting defendant's two and one/half hour 
to four hour detention). 
Moreover, even though the deputy's questions generated an incriminating 
response (R. 59), add. B, his questions did not transform the situation into a custodial one 
requiring Miranda warnings. Indeed, the questions were minimal without any objective 
suggestion of coercion. As noted previously, the record is devoid of indication that the 
deputy's demeanor or the surrounding circumstances in the five-minute interview created 
an atmosphere from which a reasonable person would have felt that his freedom of action 
was curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. Ibid. 
* * * 
For the reasons detailed above, the trial court erred as a matter of law when 
it failed to fully analyze and wholly ignored factors deemed relevant to he custody 
analysis by Utah's appellate courts. Consequently, the trial court's conclusion that the 
home interview constituted custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings, exceeds 
legal boundaries and therefore merits no measure of discretion. Strausberg, 895 P.2d at 
&35 n.5; Teuscher, 883 P.2d at 929. It should be overturned. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the trial court's suppression of defendant's 
statements and remand this case for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on f3March 1998. 
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Utah Attorney General 
IAN DECKER 
assistant Attorney General 
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DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 6290 
Attorney for Defendant 
320 South 50 West 101-6 
Ephraim, Utah 84627 
Telephone: (801)283-5055 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
I 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : Case No. 971600011 
JEFFERY SCOTT WORTHINGTON : JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Jeffery Scott Worthington, by and through his attorney, 
Douglas L. Neeley, and hereby respectfully moves for this Court's Order suppressing evidence and 
advises this Court as follows: I 
1. On or about the 6th day of January, 1997, in Sevier County, State of Utah, Defendant was 
the subject of a custodial police interrogation in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. 
I 
2. That during the course of said interrogation, and without the benefit of having received 
a Miranda warning, Defendant made certain involuntary incriminating remarks in violation of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I 
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3. Defendant now believes that the State will attempt to introduce these statements, obtained 
in violation of Miranda and the Fourteenth Amendment, during its case against the Defendant. 
4. Defendant's motion is based upon the accompanying memorandum of points and 
authorities. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that all evidence derived as a result of 
Defendant's custodial interrogation be suppressed and ruled inadmissable in Plaintiffs case in chief 
against the Defendant. 
DATED this / * day of June, 1997. 
04L. 
DOUGLAS L. NEELE 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this Jfj££&ay of June, 1997,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Motion To Suppress and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion 
To Suppress, postage prepaid, to R. Don Brown, Sevier County Attorney, at 835 East 300 North, 
Suite 100, Richfield, Utah, 84701. 
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Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE SDCTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFERY SCOTT WORTHINGTON 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 971600011 
JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Jeffery Scott Worthington, by and through his attorney, 
Douglas L. Neeley, and hereby submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 6th day of January, 1997, the Defendant, Jeffery Scott Worthington, was 
arrested for possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia. The incidents and 
circumstances leading up to that arrest are as follows: 
1. At about 08:00 hours on the morning of January 6,1997, Sergeant Kim Sorensen was 
summoned to the business offices of Georgia Pacific to investigate the suspected drug use by an 
employee. Upon arriving, Sergeant Sorensen was presented with a small box measuring 
approximately 2 X 3 inches long and 1 inch deep which officers of Georgia Pacific believed to 
contain narcotics. Sergeant Sorensen was informed by officers of Georgia Pacific that the box in 
question was found by one of its employees in an employee restroom sometime early that morning 
and that it was likely left by an employee on the graveyard shift. 
2. After testing the substance in the box and finding it contained a certain amount of 
methampetamines, Sergeant Sorensen proceeded directly to the home of the Defendant, Jeffery 
"Scott" Worthington, to question him about his knowledge of the incidence. Sergeant Sorensen 
testified that he had connected Defendant to the commission of the crime by reason of the following 
alleged facts: 
A. The box contained a handwritten inscription inside which essentially read: "Scott, 
from your mother to you." 
B. Statements from certain officers and employees of Georgia Pacific supported the^  
conclusion that the box was left by someone on the graveyard shift. 
C. Sergeant Sorensen was informed by officers of Georgia Pacific that only one 
"Scott," the Defendant, worked on the graveyard shift. 
3. Sergeant Sorensen arrived at Defendant's home several hours after the Defendant had 
returned from working the graveyard shift at Georgia Pacific. Upon knocking at Defendant's door, 
Sergeant Sorensen was greeted by Defendant's five-year old son who went to wake up the 
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Defendant. In the mean time, Defendant's wife had come to the door and invited Sergeant Sorensen 
inside. Defendant was awakened from sleeping on the couch to find Sergeant Sorensen standing in 
his living room. Without giving Defendant his Miranda warning, Sergeant Sorensen produced the 
box containing methamphetamines and began questioning Defendant about his knowledge of the 
box, whereupon Defendant made certain incriminating statements acknowledging that the box 
belonged to him. Having obtained this admission, Sergeant Sorensen, again, without giving 
Defendant his Miranda warning, asked if Defendant knew of the contents of the box. When 
Defendant answered in the negative, Sergeant Sorensen began to name off the items contained in the 
box, whereupon Defendant made further incriminating statements. At this point, Defendant was 
arrested and taken into custody. 
ISSUE 
The court must now decide two (2) important questions: (1) whether a defendant who is 
awakened from his sleep to find a police officer in his home, and who is confronted by questioning 
and accusatory evidence, is sufficiently prejudiced as to require a Miranda warning under State and 
Federal law; and (2) whether statements made during that interrogation were voluntary under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
It is Defendant's contention that the merits of this case require a suppression of evidence 




The State's questioning of the Defendant under the 
circumstances constituted an custodial interrogation for 
purposes of Mining y, Arizona-
The Fifth Amendment to the Unites States Constitution protects against self-incrimination. 
See U.S. Const. Amend. V. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court 
laid out certain procedural safeguards designed to protect individuals suspected of a crime from the 
"inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individuals will to resist and compel 
him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely". The procedural requirements of Miranda 
are now almost universally known by practitioner and layman alike and need not be rehearsed to this 
Court. 
While later cases have illustrated the non-constitutional nature of Miranda, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has nevertheless held fast to the idea that failure to administer Miranda warnings, creates an 
irrefutable presumption of compulsion requiring exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence from 
the prosecutors case in chief. Oregon v. Elstad. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). In order for Miranda to apply 
both a custodial setting and official, interrogation is required. See Alston v. Redman. 34 F.3d 1237 
(3dCir.l994). 
(A) Custody: Federal law defines custody for purposes of Miranda as whether a person's 
freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarthy. 468 
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U.S. 420,440 (1984). The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that custodial interrogation can take 
place in one's own home. In Orozco v. Texas. 394 U.S. 324 (1969), a case not unlike the one before 
this Court now, the Supreme Court held that a defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda 
when policeman entered a defendant's home at 4:00 a.m. and tried to elicit incriminating information 
from him. Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court held in a subsequent case to Orozco that a defendant 
was not in custody for purposes of Miranda, when the defendant invited F.B.I. agents into his home 
to discuss their investigation of criminal tax fraud. Beckwith v. United States. 425 U.S. 341 (1976) 
(emphasis added). 
The court should have no difficulty distinguishing the fact pattern here from that of Beckwith 
based upon the involuntary confrontation created by Defendant waking to find Sergeant Sorensen 
already in his presence. Additionally, like the defendant in Orozco. Defendant here was awakened 
from his sleep to confront a police officer trying to elicit incriminating statements from the 
Defendant. 
The Utah Supreme Court has refined the custody analysis of Miranda for state purposes 
setting out five factors that should be considered: (1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether the 
investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; (4) the 
length and form of the interrogation, including the presence of coercive or compulsive strategy on 
the officers' part in conducting the interrogation; and (5) whether the defendant came to the place 
of interrogation freely and willingly. See e.g., Salt Lake City v. Carner. 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah Ct. 
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App. 1983); SttfrViKflfr, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah 1986); State v. Mirquet 844 P.2d 995 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
As the Court will see, application of these factors weigh heavily in favor of custody in under 
the present circumstances: 
(1) Site of the interrogation: While Defendant was interrogated within the confines of his 
own home, a factor which obviously works against custody, the circumstances attendant to this 
locale do not admit of ready dismissal by the court. Here, the Defendant was being questioned and 
confronted in his home immediately after being awakened midway through his daily rest. Defendant 
did not admit Sergeant Sorensen into his home, but rather awoke to find him already present. "[TJhe 
site of interrogation . . . does not lead to a conclusion of custody as readily as a station house -
interrogation. Still it is not, however, as free of compulsion as questioning on a sidewalk." Mirquet, 
at 999. 
It is Defendant's contention that the facts attendant to the place of interrogation were in this 
circumstance highly indicative compulsion. Here, Defendant was isolated within the confines of his 
home, after being awaken from his daily rest, to find a police officer already in his presence, 
confronting him with accusatory evidence and questioning. 
(2) Whether the investigation focused on the accused: If the Court will read the relevant 
portions of Sergeant Sorensen's testimony at the preliminary hearing (See p. 6 lin 7-25, attach as 
Exhibit "A"), it will become immediately apparent that Defendant was the sole suspect in Sergeant 
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Sorensen's investigation. Sergeant Sorensen testified that after finding the box contained 
methamphetamines, he proceeded directly to the home of the Defendant and that he did not even 
attempt to contact other employees. 
Sergeant Sorensen's testimony also reveals the factors which lead him to suspect the^ 
Defendant. First, the box contained the inscription "Scott". Secondly, statements made to Sergeant 
Sorensen supported the conclusion that the box was left by an employee on the graveyard shift. 
Thirdly, Sergeant Sorensen's investigation had revealed that only one "Scott", the Defendant, 
worked on the graveyard shift. 
(3) Whether the objective indicia of arrest were present: It is Defendant's contention that the 
most fundamental indicia of arrest is the presence of a police officer. While there may not have been 
"readied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns, yet defendant was isolated . . . with an officer 
accusing him of a crime. One element of any arrest is going to be such an accusation". Mirquet. at 
999. | 
In Salt Lake City v. Carner. supra, the court stated that it is "at the point the environment 
becomes custodial or accusatory, a police officer's questions must be prefaced with a Miranda 
warning. Id. at 1170. The Utah Court of Appeals has, on numerous occasions, clearly "identified 
the change from investigatory to accusatory questioning as happening when the police have 
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and also reasonable grounds to 
believe that the defendant has committed it." Mirquet at 998 (quoting Salt Lake City v. Carner. 664 
7 
P.2d 1168,1170 (Utah Ct.App.1983)); See also State v. Kellv. 718 P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986). As 
noted under factor two (2), Sergeant Sorensen's investigation had clearly focused upon the 
Defendant, at the exclusion of all other employees; his sole purpose in confronting Mr. Worthington 
was to illicit incriminating statements. Therefore, under Utah law, the only reasonable inference this 
Court can draw from Sergeant Sorensen's questioning is that it was (a) accusatory in nature; and (b) 
"an attempt to get evidence". Mirquet. supra. 
(4) The length and form of the interrogation, including the presence of coercive or 
compulsive strategy on the officers' part in conducting the interrogation: While the length of 
interrogation does not compel a finding of custody here, the same argument made under factor three 
(3) above supports custody under the form of interrogation. As noted immediately above, Utah law 
clearly characterizes Sergeant Sorensen's questioning as accusatory and "at the point the 
environment becomes custodial or accusatory, [that] a police officer's questions must be prefaced 
with a Miranda warning". Salt Lake City vf Camer, at 1170. 
It is also evident from the circumstances, that a coercive strategy was present during the 
interrogation. As noted above, the fact that Sergeant Sorensen believed that the Defendant had 
committed the crime, leads inescapably to the conclusion that "the questioning that followed was an 
attempt to get evidence to support that conclusion." Mirquet at 1000. 
Another fact that the Court should consider relevant to this analysis is Sergeant Sorensen's 
proffering of accusatory evidence during the interrogation. Indeed, Sergeant Sorensen began the 
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questioning by producing the box containing the methamphetamines and showing it to the 
Defendant. When Defendant later responded that he did not know of the boxes contents, after 
admitting the box belonged to him, Sergeant Sorensen began naming off the items which the box 
contained. It would be unreasonable for this Court to find that this was not a coercive or compulsive 
strategy. 
(5) Whether the defendant cam? to tte place of interrogation fregly and willingly: It is clear 
from the circumstances of this case that the Defendant did not come to the place of interrogation 
I 
freely and willingly. Defendant was awakened from sleeping on the couch to find Sergeant Sorensen 
already present in his living room. 
The application of these five factors to the facts of this case should lead this Court to -
conclude that Defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona. 
(B) Interrogation: The leading U.S. Supreme Court case on the concept of interrogation 
for purposes of Miranda is Rhode Island v. Innis. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). In Innis. the U.S. Supreme 
Court expanded the concept of interrogation to include situations where a "person in custody is 
subject to either express questioning or its functional equivalent which the police know [is] likely 
to elicit an incriminating response" (emphasis added); See also State v. Fulton. 742 P.2d 1208 
(Utah 1987). A further expansion of the concept of interrogation occurred one year later the court 
held that a defendant had been interrogated for purposes of Miranda when police officers confronted 
the defendant with incriminating evidence by way of a recorded statement implicating him in a 
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crime. Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477 (1981); See also People v. Ferro. 472 N.E.2d 13 (1984) 
(interrogation found where police placed the fruits of defendant's crime in front of his jail cell). 
It should be obvious to the Court that the present case presents facts virtually 
undistinguishable from that of Edwards. Defendant was confronted with incriminating evidence by 
way of a box which contained his name. Defendant was also confronted with incriminating evidence 
when Sergeant Sorensen began to name off the items which the box contained. Defendant points 
the court to the following statements made by Sergeant Sorensen at the preliminary hearing. See 
Exhibit "A" attached. 
Additionally, it would be illogical, unreasonable and against precedence, for this Court to. 
find that all of Sergeant Sorensen's question were not such as were "reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response". Sergeant Sorensen knew at the time he began to question the Defendant 
that: (a) the box contained the inscription "Scott"; (b) that it had likely been left by someone on the 
graveyard shift; (c) that the Defendant was the only "Scott" which worked the graveyard shift; and 
(d) that the box contained methamphetamines. Surely Sergeant Sorensen knew that the questions: 
"Do you recognize this box?"and "Do you know what it contains?" were likely to elicit incriminating 
responses from the Defendant. 
The State will attempt to argue that Sergeant Sorensen in fact did not know that his questions 
were likely to produce such a result and that his questioning was merely investigatory in nature. 
However, as it has been discussed above, under Utah law, investigatory questioning changes to 
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accusatory questioning when the police have reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been 
committed and reasonable grounds to believe that defendant has committed it. Mirquet supra. 
Furthermore, state law requires "at the point that the environment becomes custodial or accusatory, 
a police officers questions must be prefaced with a Miranda warning. Salt Lake City v. Carner. at 
1170 (emphasis added). Applying these requirements to the present facts leads to the inescapable 
conclusion that Sergeant Sorensen had the requisite "reasonable belief required before he arrived 
at Defendant's home, and certainly after Defendant admitted to owning the box in question. 
It is Defendant's contention that, despite the merits of all argument heretofore, the holdings 
of Salt I^ke Citv v. Carner and State v. Sampson themselves alone require that a Miranda warning 
be given under the present facts. 
POINT II 
Despite Miranda. Defendants admissions were involuntary 
for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Fifth Amendment's 
privilege against self-incrimination, prohibits coerced statements. See Malloy v. Hogan. 378 U.S. 
1, 84 S.Ct. 1486 (1964). The question of whether statements are coerced under the Fourteenth 
Amendment is determined by the totality of the circumstances, United States v. Falcon, 766 F.2d 
1469,1476 (10th Cir.1985), with coercion being determined from the perspective of the suspect. 
See e.g., United State v. Short 947 F.2d 1445,1449 (10th Cir.1991). If a confession is involuntary 
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under the Fourteenth Amendment, as opposed to merely Miranda defective, it cannot be admitted 
even for impeachment purposes in the prosecutor's case. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
In determining whether particular statements have been coerced, the Tenth Circuit considers 
many factors, inter alia, the suspect's education and intelligence, whether he was advised of, or knew 
his constitutional rights, whether he signed consent or a waiver form, whether his will was 
overborne, his capacity to resist pressure, the conduct of the law enforcement officers, and the 
environment in which the questioning took place. See e.g., United State v. Short. 947 F.2d 1445, 
1449 (10th Or. 1991); United States v. Chalan. 812 F.2d 1302,1307-1308 (10th Cir. 1989). 
While it is true that a majority of cases decided under the Fourteenth Amendment have not 
found a defendant's statements to be coerced, the special circumstances surrounding this case require. 
special consideration. 
The most fundamental fact relating to coercion in the present case is the fact that the^ 
Defendant, Jeffery Scott Worthington, was awaken midway through his daily rest to find a policeman 
in his presence and to face accusatory questioning and evidence. This Court should be able to 
recognize without the sophistication of expert testimony or inundated case law, that a persons ability 
to think cognitively is greatly reduced upon being awaken suddenly in the middle of, what is 
effectively here, the night. Add to this the unexpected presence of Sergeant Sorensen, the immediate 
questioning, and the accusatory nature of the interrogation, and you have an environment which is 
highly indicative of coercion. 
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Tfm* nrn» fii si aires nf* Defendant's questioning also have a direct bearing cm many of the 
factors considered by the lenth Circuit outlined above Particularly, the suspect's intelligence, 
whethei I nfif U mil npiK , m'l iWi- iui \\\\\ u,>, 'verborne, his capacity to resist' 
pressure, and the environment in which the questioning is aiso from the 
facts, t1 i*mt was never ac\ :^cu.. „. • - or 
luim. s^i ui uicse facts, combined with the conduct of St, n in confront e 
Defendant with accusatory evidence, should lead this Court to conduce uiai ^ieienaai.t s staiemr s 
fTinHili1" Inii Serjeant Sniensen were coerced and that his statements should be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
I he Lkk jiiiltiiiii iniiim 1" 11i4.ii S e i g c a i i t f * oftfr Defendant in his home 
on or about January 6th, 1997, violated his Miranda rights and that the statements he made v 
coerced within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourtt t. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant Worthington respectfully requests that this court suppress all 
statements made by him to Sergeant Sorensen from the State's case undv* ,,*. .... h 
AiiRhilmeni il 'ilten>.»h\v finin illn Si iir * i j 1 v iii luml under Miranda v, Ariz , ' iiiiii 
Jj_ day of June, 1997. 
/ / i^^t 
^ . ^ DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 
Attorney for Defendant 
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DISTRICT COURT, SEVIER COUNTY , UJL&i I / J ^ S 
895 East 300 North 
Richfield, UT 84701 
Telephone: 801-896-2700 Fax: 801-896-8047 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
JF l-TER 'I ' Ml 11 ""I I i I"»M'"IlllNGTf Ih 1 „ 
Defendant. 
FIN DINGS OF f I I C T AND D E O S I O N 
• c: , lit i • s 7 i 5 : : : n 
A H i f nil in i mi mi b u l g e I. Jn v k l L 1 1 in i ill 
Defendant filed a m :: tic n I z b u s i e s i I l i e h e a i i n p win liu'lliil m iiiiiii |! m^wA II /, II i "i I" \ 
Preliminary Examination had been held on February 11,1997 and a transcript of those 
proceedings was referred to and used during the course of the hearing on the Motion tc Supp i ' s s s. 
From the evidence offered at both the Hearing on the Motion and the Preliminary Examination, 
the Court has sufficient evidence to find the following facts: 
FTNDINQSOFFACT 
1. Kim Sorensen is a deputy of the Sevier County Sheriff. On January 6,1997 he 
was a request ^nd, officials at. the Georgia Pacific sheet 
rock manufacturing plant in Sigurd, Sevier County, Utah. 
2. The Deputy went to that location and iiieli m it f 
Georgia Pacific. He received from them a small white cardboard box, 
rm23i i 
-57-
OF FACT ANDDECISION^ Case number 971600011, Page -2-
approximately 2" X 3" and about an inch deep. There was handwriting inside the 
lid which included the name "Scott." 
3. During a conversation with Mr. Williams and Mr. Hope, the deputy learned of the 
following sequence of events. 
A. The employee restroom at Georgia Pacific was checked by the cleaning 
lady the night before. 
B. After the graveyard shift ended on January 6,1997 the little white 
cardboard box was found on the floor in a stall in the same employee 
restroom and 
C. That the names of employees who had worked the graveyard shift had been 
checked and that only one person named Scott who worked that shift was 
the defendant JefFery Scott Worthington. 
4. The deputy took the box and its contents to the Sheriffs office where he met with 
another deputy, Delbert Lloyd. Both deputies used what is known as a field test 
kit, to examine a substance inside the box which tested positive for being 
Methamphetamine. 
5. The deputy went to the defendant's home. His knock at the door was responded 
to by a young child named Keith. The defendant at that time was asleep on the 
couch. 
f70S25lje 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION, Case number 97160001 h Page J-
6. Mrs. Worthington came to the door. The deputy said, "There was an incident that 
with Scott?" 
n
 Mrs. Worthington admitted the deputy into the room where the c ' I 
provided a chair for him to sit on next to the couch. The following exchange 
occurred between the deputy and the defendant, who was then sitting up on the 
Sorensen Are you Scott Worthington? 
ill mi 1 1 in > . 
Sorensen: (retrieving a bag out of his pocket and showing the little white 
cardboard box) Have you seen this before? 
Defendant: (No response.) 
mi ini 1 1 ni In the box yours? 
: (1 Jc J: esf onse.) 
Sorensen: I am going to name for you the items that are inside this box. 
Defendai opened the box kfewe hi 11 LIM «^ «I n what is inside, but 
after that I put the lid back on and put it away. 
DECISION 
The questions asked by the Deputy amounted to a custodial interrogation. Under those 
mos\M 
. rt~ 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION, Case number 971600011, Page -4-
tircumstances, the Deputy was required to warn the defendant about his rights to remain silent 
and to counsel No such warnings were given. Hence, the answer is given by the defendant must 
be suppressed. 
The reasons that lead the Court to conclude that this was a custodial interrogation are as 
follows: 
In terms of the physical place of interrogation, it was obviously the defendant's home. 
However, in terms of the defendant's consciousness, it arrived at the place of interrogation from a 
state of being unconscious or asleep to a state of being conscious or awake in the presence of a 
police officer making accusatory statements. The deputy's attention was focused on the 
defendant before he ever arrived at the defendant's home. 
Mr. Neeley is appointed to draft an order that is consistent with this decision and to 
submit it for execution by following the procedures set forth in Rule 4-504 Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Dated this *— day of August, 1997. 
DXVIDL. MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
f70C251Jt 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION, Case number 971600011, Page -5-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
4^ OnTAagttst 3 .1997 a copy of the above FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION 
was sent to each of the following by the method indicated: 
Addressee Method (M-w* f a P W » B J B ) / " MsUiOd tMnwd I • WMU.-IH) 
Mr. R. Don Brown pj Mr. Douglas Neeley j ) 
Sevier County Attorney Attorney at Law 
835 East 300 North, Suitr 1 On 320 S. 50 W. 101-6 
Richfield, UT 84701 Ephraim, UT 84627 
/ / JMC L ^y.i. , , *et^t^y£lf. 
c p y i r -
'!i7(ii;i i? rn :\ 10 
DISTRICT COURT, SEVIER COITI IHTFAH ( ^ J > _ 
895 East 300 North 
Richfield, U T 84701 
Tdephooe: 801-896-2700 Fax: 801-896-8047 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
JEFFERY SCOTT WORTHINGTON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Assigned Judft: Otvid L Mower 
III III in Iiiiiiilill llliiin I jui'iil ml Il Hi i I "i iiiiiiiril ill i ill i onsirirr its decision issued on September 2 , 199] 
on the Motion to Suppress. The basis o f the request or the Motion for Reconsideration is that the 
Court may have failed to rely on the mc&l i t iw i l A|'|>ellulc I « i""i I ikivti i i called State 
vs. Mjrqygt. 
The Court has reviewed the most recent case, which is one issued by the U tah Supi erne 
Coiirt in 1996 and which is found at 914 P. 2d 1144, 1996 Utah LEXIS 39 (Utah Supreme Court, 
April 18, 1996.) 
11 1 I i i in r j (liiiil1 If • r l r r i s i n i 1 li i e made w a s wrong. I think that I 
correctly interpreted and applied the four factors to be considered in determining custodial 
interrogation. 
Hence, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied. 
i?10!?Ue 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, Case number 971600011, Page -2-
I remind Mr. Neeley that he is still under an obligation to prepare an Order as a result of 
the decision referred to here. 
Dated this I ' day of October, 1997. 
ma-
DAVID L.MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On October/?'—, 1997 a copy of the above ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION was sent to each of the following by the method indicated: 
Addressee Method (M-nan. PS. Do**. P-P«^ Addressee Method <M-mia. p-h DMOP. F-F«I 
Mr. R. Don Brown "\\ Mr. Douglas Neeley l ^ C _ 
Sevier County Attorney Attorney at Law 
835 East 300 North, Suite 100 320 S. 50 W. 101-6 
Richfield, UT 84701 Ephraim, UT 84627 
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11TH FEBRUARY 1997 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
MR. NEELEY: rm tony. 
THE COURT: That's okay I know you're getting 
stretched out, Mr. Neeley. Do you need a break 1" 
MR, NEELEY: No. Pm fine 
THE COURT: - o r shad we forge ahead? 
What are you expecting in Mr. Worthington's case? 
MR. NEELEY: A fwKmioary healing, Yooi" He i i : ir 
T H E C O U R T : Mr Brown, are yon ready for that "Hi 
happen . 
MR. BROWN: Yes 
THE COURT: Any preliminary math ill I" 
MR. BROWN.: No. 
THE COURT: Ready to call your witness? 
MR. BROWN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
PLAINTIFFS WITNESS 
MR. BROWN: We call Sergeant Sorensen. 
THE COURT: Mr Sorensen, would you please. 
[WITNESSES CAME FORWARD] 
CLERK: Do you solemnly swear that the testimony 
you're about to give in the case pending before this court 
is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 
help you god? 
5 
/ %li, there, 'was two-or two guys in the office at 
the time There was a Rob Williams , who is the safety 
manager, plus I believe the! name was Richard Hop e. 
Q And did they advise you thai they thought it ht 
contain controlled substances? 
i rhey just said 'that there was something in there 
that they needed to have somebody come and take a 'look at 
H. They wasn't ready to make any judgements at that 'time. 
Q Did you take a look s t H? 
1 Ad. 
Q Did yon perform any tests on it? 
A I did. Brought it back here to 'the office where 
myself and Lieutenant Lloyd run a field test on it. 
11 1 >k • i" il IMI when yon. say a field test what kind of 
a. test k i . j 
A It."1!; JIIIIIDI l i t i t "il i!!!:"!i!:"il:. k i t t h a t i t 1 i ^ f c M i i: iiiir 
negative, irhichever the case may "be, with whatever gvbstajiee 
you put into H. j 
111 And in performing the field test, did ft give you 
an indication of what substance was present? 
A Yes. It tested positive for methamphetamtnes. 
Q In conjunction 'with your investigation of' 'that 
item,, did you contact, 'the defendant? 
A I did. 
Q And where did you contact l inl 1 
[Page 
I 1} 
[ 2 ] 
[ 3 ] 
Ml 
[ 5 ] 
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( 1 ) 
[2J 
[ 3 ] 
[ 4 ] 
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THE WITNESS: I do.. 
THE COURT: Sit down, please.. 
[WITNESS TOOK THE WITNESS STAND] 
KIM SORENSEN, called and sworn at the instance of 
Plaintiff, testified as fellows: 
DIRECT EX AMINATION 
BY MR BROWN: 
CI Stall i:: } cii iiif" n u n c and. occupation. 
mil! Kim Sorensen I*m in. S e r f cant with S e w - County 
Sheriffis Oifl „ 
ili:ilW!i:!:iiliiilii:iiiiii!!i!i::i:iii<. " I l l e re 
as. 
*n that occasion did yon) asosrfa a Bequest from 
Georgia Pacific that you contact them, with regard to the 
suspected use of •arcotaos by an employee? 
d. 
**^ vet? Twrpo*"1 *** that location/ 
juu receive uoiu ihem an hem? 
d. 
*hat was tha**» 
* t ht t ie wtntf M ,•* 
%nd about an met Jeep 
nrmck- i ' that 
f* 
**? tOOU 
« *iw> were the persons Bf«S«tt daring t h a t 
-•— -* 
-a s , I beheve, 
irtc*t «** * JlllQ. 
WI advbe Imp *J# yopr *f>«sn«i for being there? 
^ nd did you cxput ~ him the item that had been 
f f ' * " *hc (.r&'-'fti Huctftt employees? 
* die l held it up and showed At to him. I had 
*- .' *» *
 f ^session at the tune 
* f»d did yon u i nu_ with icgaid to his luiowie..dge 
KS** ' 4 tnat rteirs? 
* I asked him, at first, if he*d ever seen the hoc 
and he said yes, that it was his box. And I asked him what 
was. the contents? At first, he: told, me he didVt know, that 
'he: hadn't looked inside 
CI : 1 :] DM IK: later dautjt that? 
1 • si, lie: did. 
Q And what, did lie fatter indicate to you? 
> ( I I Ill I started to' name off 'the items 
that for his information I wanted to name off the hems that 
was in the box to show him. Tbat was when he said, "Well, 
my wife-I*ve opened the box and I've seen what was in it, 
• . , , - , . 
il  I. LiddeH, RPR Official Reporter Sixth Judicial District 
Transcript 
Page 7 
[ 1] but that was when I just pot the lid back on and pot it 
[2 ] away." 
[ 3] Q Okay. Did he ever acknowledge to yon that he knew 
[ 4] that there was methamphetamine? 
[5] A No. 
[6 ] Q So he acitiK)wledged that he bad the box and it was 
[7] iris, but denied knowledge of the methamphetamine? 
(8) A Yes. 
(9 ) Q Okay. I have no farther questions. 
{10] THE COURT: Mr. Necley? 
[11] CROSS EXAMINATION 
[12] BY MR. NEELEY: 
[13] Q I understand yon talked to a Mr. Williams and a 
[14] Mr. Hope? 
[15] A Yes. 
[16] Q Mr. Williams is a safety-
[17] A Pardon? 
[18] Q Excuse me. Mr. Williams is a safety manager at 
[19] Georgia Pacific? 
(20] A Yes. 
p i ] Q And where did he tell yon he had found the box? 
[22] A He said that one of his employees bad found it in 
[23] the rettroom in the mill and then they brought it there. He 
[24] had brought it to htm and told him—or-excme me. He had 
(25] told-the employee had told Mr. Williams that he had found 
Page 8 
[ 1] this box. He went and got Mr. Williams and they went back 
[2] to the site where this box was in the restroom. 
[3] Q Is that a restioom that everyone in the mill has 
( 4] access to? 
[5] A Ah, pretty much, yes. 
(6 ] Q And so did Mr. Wtftiams retrieve that and take it 
[7] to Ins office and bold that until you arrived? 
[8 ] A Held it till I got there. 
[9 ] Q WhaWafter you tested the substance of the box, 
[10] why did you go to Mr. Wortirington's home? 
[11] A To talk to Mr. Worthington to find out if he knew 
[12] what was in this box, and talk to him about the matter, 
[13] itself. 
[14] Q Did you go to all the other employees* homes? 
[15] A No, sir, I didn't. 
[161 Q So why did you go to Mr. Worthington's? 
[17] A Because on the inside-and I don*t remember the 
[18] exact wording, but si was something like the effect "Prom 
[19] your mother to you", or something. But it had his name 
[20] written on the-handwritten on the inside of the lid on the 
[21] box. I asked Mr. Worthington-
[22] Q Do you have the box here? 
{23] A It's in the Evidence Room over at the Sheriffs 
[24] Office. 
[25] Q Did you do any fingerprint analysis on the box? 
Page 9 
( I ) A No. 
[2] Q Did it say, at the-
( S] Q Did you say at the top of the box it has his name 
[ 4] written in it? 
(5) A It has his name, "Scott". 
(61 Q "Scott"? 
(1J A Yes. 
[ 8 ] Q That's the only name it has? 
( t ) A Yes. 
(10) Q Just Scott? 
[II] A Well, tt*s-there*s tome handwriting, but it says 
[12] just the name Scott. 
[13] Q Well, did you ascertain how many Scotts worked at 
[14] the plant? 
[15] A Only one on the graveyard shift 
(16] Q What led you to believe that that box had only 
[17] been there on the graveyard shift? 
[18] A According to the cleaning lady that worked there 
[19] earlier that night, that had cleaned the restrooms, said 
[20] that there wasn't anything Kke that in there when they-tbe 
[21] other employee that had found the box, H was just a couple 
[22] of hours after Mr. Worthington had left that he went into 
[23] the restroom. So it was some time between 7:00 o'clock at 
[24] night until 7:00 o'clock the next morning. 
[25] Q So for a 12-hour period it could have been put 
Page 10 
[ 1] there any of that time? 
[2 ] A As far as I could ascertain, yes. 
[3] Q Who was present when you went to Mr. Worthington's 
[4] address? 
( 5] A Himself, bis wife, myself, and a small child. 
( t ] Q Was Mrs. Worthington there the entire time? 
(7) A Yes, she was. 
( 8 ] O She answered the door? 
( » ] A No. The small child did. He answered the door 
[10] and said-I asked if I could see the dad and he said, "Just 
[11] ft minute." I stood there unoVI believe then that was 
[12] when Mrs. Worthington come to the door and I just asked if I 
[13] could see Mr. Worthington. And the said; "Yes. He's right 
[14] here." He was laying on the couch in the front room. 
[15] * Q Okay. So what suspicions did you have, at that 
[16] tbne, against Mr. Worthington? 
(17] A Just the possession of the-of the meth and the 
[18] paraphernalia that was in the box. 
[19] Q And the fact that the name "Scott" was on the box? 
[20] A And there was the name Scott that was on the lid 
(21] of the box. 
[22] Q And he was the only one on the graveyard shift 
[23] that had the name Scott? 
[24] A According to the plant manager, yes. 
[25] Q And he had worked that evening? 
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f
. *nd did you advise Mr Worthington •• lo why yon 
* a.u. JU*» asked tttni 1!< he Jtuul ever seen the 'box 
C »*" *~« " 7 a n d i i e Mr WorthJngtoii at that time? 
/ .... 1 
C id voi) asx. Mi. 'Woithington if he was wilting to 
tpetk •**• "t>t oance firing— 
C 
A 1 did. 
Q .And his. response to you wis that ft. was Ins box? 
A It 'wis bis box, 'that be; had loaned it 'to his 
mm r 
• Did lie pay how long ago that bad 'been? ] 
A No 1 
Q Di 3 yon tell him. where you'd found the box? 
A I did 
Q "What, did he say to that? 1 
A. Said that he had had it with him that night and he 
had went to the restroom and he had as 1 recall, I "think, he 
13 
Mr Neeley? 
MR. NEELEY: Can I have just a moment, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Snre. 
[OFF-RECORD CONSULTATION] 
THE COURT: Mr. Miekeboi 
Mr. Neeley? 
MR.. NEELEY: Your Honor, I'd like to recall 
Officer Sorensen 
THE. COURT: Okay Would you please, Mr. Sorensen. 
KIM SORENSEN, called and sworn earner mt the instance of 
Plaintiff, testified under recall as follows: 
RECALl DIRECT' EXAMINATION 
BY MR, NEELEY: 
Q Did you make a tape recorcfiiif of tin uinvc nation 
had you with Mr. Worthington? 
s nn *w>n>,- " 
"?i. 
-
nd you subsequemlv interview Mr. Worthtngtoo, 
after the interview «* hs» **s>^ 
Did you arrest Mr. Worthington then? 
After he'd identified the box, saying th* » * 
bw and saying that he did open the box and act ^ *-.>f* 
thai N»*; - tx tout him that I didn't bavt an> OKMCC m 





















































•aid he'd taken it out of Ms box-or I mean out of his 
pocket, set it on the floor so he wouldn't dump it out. But 1 
be had forgot to pick it. up,, wfae.ii. he left. 1 
O 'Did you attem.pt. to get an arrest warrant,, prior to' 
going to Mr. Worthington."s home? 
A No. I didn't. 
Q Did. you feel,, at tint:, time, you. bad probable cause: 1 
to arrest: M;.i: Worthington? 
MR. BROWN: Objection. It's irrelevant 
THE COURT: What he believed? 
What about thai, Mr. Neeley? 
MB; NEELEY: 1 think, 'he can 'testify as to whether 
or not he had a probable cause to arrest. It goes to 
whether or not -h goes to the Miranda issue. 
1 'Ill BROWN: 'There is no Miranda issue. He wasn't 
'under arrest,, 
THE COURT: Ah, I agree with the State. I'ne 
objection is sustained. D o n t answer the question. Ask 
another auesnon. 
Q BY MR. NEELEY: Did Mr Worthington tell you that 
he did not want to talk to you? 
THE WITNESS: No, sir. 
Q Okay That's all 1 b i t e . 
il  Ill 111 ill 1 11 1 1J Nri ci tions. The State tests. 
111 i I I ii I I  (11 I  1 ha n 11, Mr. Sorensen. 
14 
the matte i, but 1 was to place nun «u m < i 
CI II l'1 in 1 11 Hi iirtf r w w him fiftf i I  I  IM1 ill 11 m ft? 
A 
CI ' inn11 iniIf1 mi IIIiim toneiTICi' h i n t a f t t i t h e a r r e s t ? 1 
ii'l Il 1 II ml in in mi mi i f llliiiiiiiiiiiiiiti mi II 
MR. NEELEIr t h u s »> . H H 
MR. BROWN: No questions. 
1 HE COURT: Thanks, Mr, Sorensen. 
What else, Mr. Neeley? 
MR. NEELEY: Call Thehn. WoftMogton, Your Honor. 
HE COURT: Thelma Worthington, is that you? Gome 
nt <m*Gh\ I*B please R**e - >ur right hand and listen to 
the clert 
:
 - *- — — -
" v t " •*• $*•>? in the case pending be 





Would you sit down right h e r e please 
•}*H M * WORTHINGTON called • .• sworn nl line fnsmnce of 1 
justified as follows I 
DIRECT E> • " HI III1 I  





* Lidded, RPR Official Reporter sixiii Jufil iLHl I Jul I 






















































Q What's your relationship, Mrs. Worthington, to 
Jeffery Scott Worthington. 
A I'm his wife. 
Q How long have TOO been married? 
A Seven years. 
Q Do yon recall, January 6th, 1997? 
A Yes 
Q Where were yon that day? 
A I was home. 
Q Who was at yoor home? 
A Me, Scott, and my ton. 
at yonr home? 
A Yet. 
Q About what time of day was that? 
A I'm not even tore what time it was. 
Q Okay. Did yon meet him at the door? 
A No. 
Q Who met trim first, oat of yon and Scott? 
A Neither one of us. 
Q Your child opened the door? 
A Yes. 
Q Then who spoke with him first? 
A 1 did. 
Q And where was Scott, at that time? 
17 
to Scott? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Okay. What did he first say to Mr. Worthington? 
A He said, "I better make sure yon are Mr. 
Worthington." 
Q Okay. And what did your husband say then? 
A He was sitting np on the conch and he said yes, he 
was. 
Q Okay. Then what was said? 
A Mr. Sorensen pulled a bag out of ms pocket and 
asked if Scott had seen H before. 
Q Got a bag out of his pocket? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. What was in the bag? 
A A little white box. 
Q About how big was the box? 
A I'm not sure. It was-it was just small. 
Q Okay. And what did Mr. Worthington say? j 
A He didn't say anything at that time. He had his j 
head down on his hands. 
Q He didn't say anything to that? 
A No. He ww trying to wake up. 
Q Okay. Then what was said? 
A Mr. Sorensen asked him again if the box was bis 




























A He was asleep on the couch. .' 
Q What did you do then? I 
A I asked him to come in. 1 
Q And did you wake Mr. Worthington up? 1 
A No. Keith was waking him up already. 1 
Q Okay. What did Mr. Sorensen-Oftloer Sorensen say 1 
when he came into the home? T 
* A He said that there was an incident that happened 1 
out at the plant and that Mr. Worthington wae-pN AUDIBLE]. 1 
Q Okay. 1 
THE COURT: Mrs. Worthington isn't speaking loud I 
enough for the microphone to cause the camera to shift to m 
her. I don't know if you can hear or not, but I'm having a 1 
little trouble hearing. Will you take that microphone and 1 
tilt it down a tittle bit, Mrs. Worthington, and then if you 1 
can pull up a little bit closer to it, that may help, too. 1 
Thanks. Back to you, Mr. Neeley. J 
MR.NEELEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 1 
Q BY MR. NEELEY: So please repeat again. What did 1 
Mr. Sorensen say, when he came to the residence? 1 
A He said there was an incident that happened at the 1 
mill and Mr. Worthington was the prime No. 1 suspect. 1 
Q Okay. And then what did he say? I 
A He asked to talk to Scott. 1 



























• Q Okay. Did Mr. Sorensen ever read him his Miranda , 
warning? 1 
A Yes. 1 
Q When was that? 1 
A After he showed Scott what was in the box. 1 
Q At any time did Mr. Worthington acknowledge that J 
that was Us box-? | 
A No. He did not. 
Q -that he knew what was in the box? 1 
A No, he did not. 
Q At any time did he ever take or say that he had 1 
any knowledge of that box, whatsoever? 1 
A No. He did not. 
Q Did Officer Sorensen ask him if he understood his 
Miranda warnings, after he gave them to him? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q A - w t a . d H S c o a f c n U . 7 J 
A No. He had to read him his rights again. 1 
Q He said no, he didn't understand them? 1 
A Yes. 
• Q And so he read them again? 
A Yes. J 
Q And then what did Scott say? ^ 
A He shook Ins head, no, that he didn't want to talk 
to Mr. Sorensen. 
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n ask him more questions, 
i N o . 
Then what happened? 
Scott and Mr. S o r e m e n went out the front door. i 
i>id he arreft trim at that t i n e ? 1 
-* took h im-I don V I didn*t t e e , after they 
he handcuff him inside the boose? 
! 
iu* i*i«•: <ie take htm sway in a patrol our then? 
i never came back into the home? 
" 
M R . N E E L E Y : Tbmfs all I have, Your Honor. 
M R . B R O W N : N o question*. 
T H E C O U R T : Thank y o n , Mrs. Worthinaton. 
Y O B ean take the lock,, off' that one 
What else:, Mr. N e e l e y ? : 
M R . N E E L E Y : That's all, Your Honor. 
T H E C O U R T : Any rebuttal, Mr. Brown? 
M R . B R O W N : N o t at this tone . 
T H E C O U R T : You wart to argue: or comment on the 
ev idence , Mr. Brown? 
M R . B R O W N : N o W e l l tntnmit it, 
21 
answer. D o y o n need any more time so talk t o him? 
M R . W O R T H I N G T O N : Probably, yeah . 
T H E O O U R ^ > « k * • *>* n c r* , h 5 iPi- OB 
behalf of Mr. Wort 
MR. WORTHINGTON: Oh, i'm sorry. I muuntiennood. 
THE COURT: I should take a iiot guilty plea, 
shouldn't I, Mr. Neeley"? 
MR. NEELEY: Yes, Yonr '-' • 
THE COURT: I dont see any re** 
didn't want to get ns too confined here. 
Any motions coming op in, this cane:,, Mr. Neeley? 
MR. NEELEY Yes. 
THE COURT: A motion ti i upp ie«? 
MR. NEELEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do yoo want to base ti at on a 
transcript of this hearing? 
MR. NEELEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: Or do yM i 
THE COURT: Left see To gel a fraaacrfp1 
have to' take the-[INAUDIBLE}-fa *w»g thai? I><» j \ In 
to l i e 1 1 eqnest? 
1 11 NEEI E Y : Ah»the Clerk has bern doing thai lor 
m , Your Honor It atfll takes three weeks or t o to get it. 
T H E C O U R T : And who have we been w i n g to do the 
uansu ib ing? D o yon have to specify the name of tlb» 


























THE, COURT: Mr. Neeley? 
* HI F> Suuriit n, Your Honor. 
, ' ORDER AND FINDINGS 
'THE COURT: There's probable cause to he fin mi 
the defendant committed the crime charged in the 
brfbnBS&sa 1 o n i e r him t o appear and answer. 
I have to find the infbrmatioD, 
I've got an information that was filed o n January 
«"#, ! i that the o n e tha i - I t hasn*t b e e n amended , has it , 
Mi Brown l" 
M R . B R O W N : It has not 
THE COURT: ^ '^ek in 
arraignment today. 
MR. NEELEY 
* ' « VTF*"** 
THECOuKi Ant* **ua* 
MR. NEELEY Ye- *t 
TH,E COUR~: * - a». . . - r. 
Neeley if he touid predict now yon *».««* 
charges, if I were to ask to have an answer, and he thinks 
you're gonna answer by saying, "Not grotty"; is he right 
MR. WORTHINGTON: Yeah 
THE COURT: Yon dont have to answer right this 




























-LbUr % been Mr. Ltddell, so far. 
!*k COURT Ot* \m -m Shepherd, is this 
%gjr>" > * K> been >-inf « $ f.ctg the traracrrpt? 
Okay. Ili ban tht '* » 'jesv * transcnpL 
Mr. Browfi yar 4
 v- *{»!> ***• to nave toe matter 
for in* me s&r « «•. nio^ .late, a thai vonr 
j i .CttT* 
*. . o ^ „ - „ -
that's fine wtu me Or if Mr Net 
a*** **u receiving the transcript, tik- * *i nr-
* t« a?* hearing That'j all right with n< 
Hfc COURT. Okay Mr. Neek^. i y*u would meet 
tttei dc*J'.nr and do something more than say, "I move to 
<u (/*>«> < *-ntience 
MR. NEELEY: All right. 
THE COURT: Give Mr. Brown mine ini i nioit about 
what your basis it, to b -.. - hour to tcapond. And then 
we'll u- •••', tot * 
And 111 have the Clerk schedule that by getting 
with your staff and scheduling a date for the hearing. 
Mr, Woflhington, there's a date you're gonna need 
to oomc: tack, hot, I 'dont know what that, date h right, now. 
So you keep in contact with Mr. Neeley, okay? 
I know that often times when yon call a , g 
rKt LiddeD, RPR Official Reporter Sixth Judicial District 
~3<S 




























office, yon cant get the lawyer. 
MR. WORTHINGTON: Yeah, I know. 
THE COURT: If yoo call bran—if yon call him just 
to find out about a date, then ask his staff members to betp 
yon with that because they're probably more Kkely to know 
that than he is. Okay? 
MR. WORTHINGTON: AH right. Okay. 
THE COURT: Make sore yov come back when you need 
to. Thanks 
MR. NEELEY: Thank yon. 
[WHEREUPON THE ABOVE ENTITLED PROCEEDINGS WERE 
COMPLETED] 
"OoOoO"» 














'"""-' *rr?F::.T •-'" ^r u m t i a l Reporter 
f - the ?'.KZ:I juui.'id. uistni -*-" ~f Sevier, 
6 imLtsuy cerLify that, J. * scribe the 
7 ..... vicieu tape of the proceedings he.v.. «. . a H m o ^*-o 
8 and place as set forth herein, J.. "•" -tenogr-- * .otes; 
9 that the foregoing paa»<= mffl,^?r< .-sive, 
10 constitute a -, —*.~w_' *' ' ^letp • ranscrint * ^ 
11 notes as reduces to typewni.e:. _....._ 
12 direction. 
13 I lurther certiLy Liui. I din mil tin rnjuni. , ,,u i. oi in y 
14 i counsel for any oi the parties hereto, nor am l 
1 uteresteJ in Lli" ou' '"on".' l.here"1 . 
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JUDGE MOWER: We have Mr. Worthington's file now, have 
some papers that refer to Mr. Grey. Did your learn 
about Mr. Grey today, Mr. Neeley? 
MR. NEELEY: Yes, I did. 
JUDGE MOWER: Have you talked to him? 
MR. NEELEY: Just briefly. He asked me to convey a 
message to Mr. Bagley which I have done and I need to 
give Mr. Grey Mr. Bagleyfs response outside with Mr. 
Lee. If we can get Mr. Worthington done. 
JUDGE MOWER: Let's just forge ahead with Mr. 
Worthington...see if we can complete that case. Hello 
Mr. Worthington. 
DEFENDANT: Hello, Your Honor. 
JUDGE MOWER: Mr. Lyman, what are you expecting in 
this case? 
MR. LYMAN: Uh, Motion for Suppress has been filed, 
we anticipate to call the officer that's conduct's in 
question. I'll have a few brief questions to ask him 
and then turn him over to Mr. Neeley to ask whatever 
questions he chooses. I think that's the process. 
JUDGE MOWER: Mr. Neeley, what do you expect to do? 
MR. NEELEY: Exactly... 
JUDGE MOWER: The same thing. 
MR. NEELEY: Yes. 
JUDGE MOWER: So, I have one witness that's testifying 
today? 
REBECCA J. HYDE, (435) 673-8204 
781 North Vallev View Drive. #57. St. Georee. Utah 84770 
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MR. LYMAN: Yes. 
JUDGE MOWER: Any preliminary matters you want to talk 
about Mr. Lyman? 
MR. LYMAN: Not that I know of... 
MR. NEELEY: It is possible, Your Honor, that I will 
call on Mr. Worthington for some very brief questions, 
but nothing too extensive, I hope. 
JUDGE MOWER: Any preliminary matters that you can 
think of Mr. Neeley? 
MR. NEELEY: Well, I'd inquire of the Court before we 
begin the questioning if the Court has had an 
opportunity to review the Memorandum, urn, the 
transcripts that we, at least the portion of the 
transcripts that we referred to in the Memorandum. 
JUDGE MOWER: Ifve looked briefly at the Memorandum 
and it caused me to remember hearing testimony about 
Georgia Pacific. 
MR. NEELEY: Right. 
JUDGE MOWER: And that's as far as I've gone. 
MR. NEELEY: Yeah, Your Honor did do the preliminary 
hearing, just wondering, as I recollect...yeah. 
JUDGE MOWER: Do you want to make an opening statement 
Mr. Lyman? 
MR. LYMAN: No. 
JUDGE MOWER: Mr. Neeley? 
MR. NEELEY: No, Your Honor. 
REBECCA J. HYDE, (435) 673-8204 
781 North Vallev View Drive. #57. St. Georee. Utah 84770 
JUDGE MOWER: By the way, you have an associate here, 
Mr. Neeley, and you should introduce him because I've 
forgotten his name. 
MR. NEELEY: This is Randy Kanard, Your Honor. 
JUDGE MOWER* Mr. Kanard. 
MR. NEELEY5. Two weeks ago, Mr. Kanard had the great 
opportunity to take the Bar examination. 
JUDGE MOWER: So you're awaiting the results now? 
MR. KANARD: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. NEELEY: He's bought a home in Mt. Pleasant and 
he'll be practicing law there. 
JUDGE MOWER: That's life on the edge of a cliff when 
you're awaiting the results of the Bar exam. Your 
whole future depends on it. Mr. Kanard, it's a 
pleasure to have you here today. 
MR. KANARD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
JUDGE MOWER: I look forward to your passing the Bar, 
but I don't have any control over that. 
MR. KANARD: Thank you. 
JUDGE MOWER: Only time will tell, I suppose. Mr. 
Lyman who's your witness going to be? 
MR. LYMANi Deputy Kim Sorenson. 
JUDGE MOWER: Mr. Sorenson, would you come up please? 
DEPUTY KIM SORENSON, BEING DULY SWORN, 
TESTIFIED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
REBECCA J. HYDE, (435) 673-8204 












DIRECT EXAMINATION OF DEPUTY KIM SORENSON 
BY MR. LYMAN. 
JUDGE MOWER: Please. 
Q: State your name please. 
A: Kim Sorenson. 
Q: Are you employed by the Sevier County Sheriff's 
office? 
A: I am. 
Q: And/ were you employed there on January 6, 1997? 
A: J was. 
12 1 Q: And, what's your capacity with the Sheriff's 
13 office? 
14 A: I'm a sergeant. 
15 Q: And, on that date, were you called to go and 
1 6 conduct an investigation at Georgia Pacific? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: And did you go to Georgia Pacific? 
A: I did. 
Q: And, who did you meet with when you got there? Do 
you recall? 
A: A, uh/ Rob Williams and I believe his name is 
Richard Hope. 
Q: And what was their complaint or concern? 
A: Uh, somebody off the day shift, early morning day 
shift, had found a box inside the men's restroom that 
REBECCA J. HYDE, (435) 673-8204 











was, they claim had been left by somebody of the 
graveyard shift. 
Q: Okay, did you see the box? 
A: I did. 
Q: And did you see anything that looked suspicious to 
you within or outside the box? 
A: With inside the box, I did, yes. 
Q: Okay, what was that? 
A: Urn, I canft remember just exactly the wording, but 
there was something to the effect that "it's from me to 
you"*with the name Scott written in it. It had some, 
what we call paraphernalia, there was a small amount of 
white powdery substance, a razor blade, a short piece 
of straw, a mirror. 
Q: And how big was the box, approximately? 
A: Uh, two inches, maybe, by three inches, there 
abouts and about an inch deep. 
Q: Okay, did you test any of the substances that you 
found inside the box? 
A: We did. 
Q: And, did they show positive for any controlled 
substances? 
A: They did. 
Q: What was that? 
A: Methamphetamine. 
REBECCA J. HYDE, (435) 673-8204 
781 North Vallev View Drive. #57. St. Georee. Utah 84770 
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Q: Okay, uh, did you ask either of the two gentlemen 
you were meeting with at Georgia Pacific if they had 
any idea whose box this might be? 
A: They said that there was only one person that they 
knew that worked at Georgia Pacific with the name of 
Scott and that was the Defendant. 
Q: Okay, and that would be Jeffery Scott Worthington? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Had you ever met him prior to that day? 
A: No. 
Q: * Is that the individual that is sitting with two 
counsel at the other table? 
A: Yes, it is. 
Q: As a result of, well did they give you his address 
so you would know where to contact him? 
A: Uh, I think they gave me an address and then I 
checked it in the phone book and somehow I got it. Ifm 
now sure, I don't remember now how I got the address. 
Q: Did you go out and Contact him? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: Okay, uh, where did you go to contact him? 
A: His residence. 
Q: Was he present? 
A: He was. 
Q: Was he the~one that "answered the door? 
A: No, sir. 
REBECCA J. HYDE, (435) 673-8204 
781 North Vallev View Drive. #57. St. Georee. Utah 84770 
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Q: Do you recall who did? 
A: A small boy. 
Q: Okay, and did you speak with anyone outside of 
this small boy? 
A: His wife came to the door just right after the 
small boy did. 
Q: Okay, and what did his wife say about him? 
A: He said that he was at home and was laying on the 
couch. 
Q: Were you at the front room door at that time? 
A: , Yes. 
Q: Did you see him laying on the couch? 
A: No, I was kind of at an angle and with her 
standing in the way, I really couldn't see too well. 
Q: Did you ask to speak with him? 
A: I did. 
Q: Okay, was that allowed? 
A: Yes-. 
Q: Okay, tell us how that happened. 
A: After asking if I could see him, she let me into 
the front room. They offered me a chair so I could sit 
down. Mr. Worthington was laying on the couch. It did 
look like he had either been sleeping or he was trying 
to. I'm not sure just yet. He had just gotten off the 
graveyard shift so he hadn't been there too long. I 
REBECCA J. HYDE, (435) 673-8204 
781 North Vallev View Drive. #57. St. Georse. Utah 84770 
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asked him if I could talk to him for a few minutes and 
he said yes. 
Q: Who was in the room when you spoke with him? 
A: Mr. Worthington and his wife and the small boy 
kept going back and forth. 
Q: Was his wife with you the entire time you spoke 
with him? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Uh, do you recall what the first thing was you 
asked him? 
A:
 % Something to do about the box. I believe it was 
"have you ever seen this box before?" or something to 
that effect. 
Q: Did he have any response? 
A: At first he said no, that he hadn't. 
Q: Okay, then what did you ask him? 
A: I asked him, uh, if he could, somehow I got to the 
question of the inscription that was inside the lid. 
Q: Okay, was he familiar with that inscription? 
A: Yes, he was. 
Q: Okay, after he denied recognizing the box, did he 
eventually acknowledge to you that he did recognize the 
box? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you ask him about the contents inside the box? 
A: I did. 
REBECCA J. HYDE, (435) 673-8204 
781 North Vallev View Drive. #57. St. Georee. Utah 84770 
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Q: What did you ask him? 
A: That he had ever seen any of it before and what it 
was. What was in there. 
Q: And what did he tell you? 
A: He told me no. 
Q: Okay, did you pursue that any further? 
A: I did, yes I did. When I asked him, I told him I 
would like to name the items inside the box. He said 
that would be fine. 
Q: Did you do that? 
A:
 % I did. 
Q: And after you did that or during your talking to 
him, did he make any comment about it? 
A: Just the fact that he's claimed to have loaned the 
box to his sister and that she's had it for a while. 
I'm not sure how he got the box back, but he was 
supposed to have returned it to her and he had it in 
his pocket. 
Q: When did he tell you he had it in his pocket? 
A: Pardon? 
Q: When did he claim to have it in his pocket? 
A: While at work. 
Q: And so, during the interview, he did then 
acknowledge he had it on his possession recently? Is 
that right? 
A: Yes. 
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Q: Okay, did he eventually tell you that he had the 
box or that he had left the box at Georgia Pacific? 
A: Eventually, I mean, he didn't come right out with 
it but he eventually (inaudible)• 
Q: Did he also acknowledge to you that he knew there 
was drugs and drug paraphernalia inside the box? 
A: He never did really state that any of the stuff 
inside the box was his that I recall right now, other 
than the fact that he said he had it in his pocket. He 
was supposed to return it to his sister and he took it 
out of his pocket long enough to open it up and see 
what was in it and close it back up and that was the 
last time he had anything to do with it. 
Q: Did he take it, put it back in his pocket? 
A: No, at that time, as I remember, he laid it on the 
floor. He was in one of the toilet stalls and laid it 
on the floor. 
Q: When you went to his home, did you go there with 
the intent of arresting him? 
A: No. 
Q: What did you go there for? 
A: Just for the purpose of interviewing him. To find 
out if the box was his. And if not, where it could 
have come from. If he knew somebody else by the name 
of Scott. 
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Q: As you conducted your interview, did you form 
conclusions that led you to believe that you needed to 
arrest him? 
A: After talking to him for a while, yes. 
Q: Okay, what was it that led you to believe you 
needed to arrest him? 
A: After asking him about the box, he finally 
admitted that yes, it was his box, that he did have it 
in his possession, that he did open it up and just laid 
it on the floor. 
Q: »And then at that point, you felt like you had 
sufficient to arrest him. Is that right? 
A: Yes. I 
Q: Did you arrest him? 
A: I did. 
Q: You didn't handcuff him right away then did you? 
A: No, I took him out to the car to handcuff him 
because of the small child (inaudible) take him out to 
handcuff him in front of the small boy. 
Q: Did you ever read him his miranda rights before or 
after you arrested him? 
h: No, I did not. 
Q: Thank you, no further questions, Your Honor. 
JUDGE MOWER: You may go ahead. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION OF DEPUTY KIM SORENSON 
BY MR. NEELEY. 
Q: When you, uh ran out to Georgia Pacific, did you 
perform tests on the contents of the box? 
A: No, I didnft perform the tests until we got back 
to the office with it. 
Q: How long, when were you first called out there? 
A: I don't remember the time, it was in the morning. 
Q: And you took the box and it's contents back here? 
A: , Yes, I did. 
Q: And you performed tests then? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: And then did you to Mr. Worthington1s house after 
that? 
A: I did. 
Q: Did you go back to Georgia Pacific before you went 
to Mr. Worthington1s house? 
A: No. 
Q: Did you go back to Georgia Pacific before you went 
to Mr. Worthington1s house? 
A: No. 
Q: Did you go with the employers there at Georgia 
Pacific to search records if there were any other 
individuals named Scott? 
A: No. 
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Q: Last name? 
A; No, sir. 
Q: Did they inform you that the only one,. 
A: The only one they knew of. 
Q: So, by the time you went to Mr. Worthington1s 
residence then, you knew he was employed at Georgia 
Pacific? 
A: I knew that a Scott was employed, yes. 
Q: Excuse me? 
A: I said that I knew that a Scott Worthington was 
11I employed there, yes, but I didn't. 
12 Q; And they had provided you an address? 
13 | A: That and I looked through the phone book. 
14 Q: You verified the address in the phone book? 
15 A: Well, I donft remember for sure, it seems like I 
11 
2g did, but I donft remember. 
-7 Q: But for sure they gave you the address, the 
employer? 
A: There again, Ifm not real positive. I got the 
address somehow. 
Q: They confirmed with you that was the only Scott 
employed with them? 
A: Yes,I 
Q: They confirmed with you that Mr. Scott had been, 
that Mr. Worthington had been at work that evening, 
evening before? 
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A: At work? Yes. 
Q: And you took the contents of the box and you went 
back and did the test on them? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you confirmed for you that it contained 
amphetamine? 
A: Yes. 
Q: It is safe to say that at that point in time, 
your investigation was focused on Mr. Scott Worthington 
at that time? 
A:
 % No, as far as I knew, the box could have been 
stolen by somebody. The object was to talk to him and 
see if he knew anything about it, but at that time, no, 
I had no actual focus on him, no. 
Q: Okay, isn't it true that if he identified that box 
as being his, you were going to arrest him? 
A: Well, that could have been, yes, I don't know. I 
don't, when something didn't really happen, I don't 
know, I can't really say that that's what I would have 
done. 
Q: Do you recall the preliminary hearing that 
occurred, uh, on February 11, 1997? 
A: Uh huh, yeah, I do that. 
Q: I asked you at that preliminary hearing if you 
arrested, if you did any interviewing of Mr. 
Worthington after you took him from the house. 
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A: Yes, I do remember something like that but, I 
couldn't.I 
Q: May I approach? 
JUDGE MOWER: Sure. 
MR. LYMAN: What page is the counsel reading from? 
Q: Okay, Ifm going to ask him to look at page eleven 
through fourteen. We'll start on page thirteen. If 
you want to. 
MR. LYMAN: Thirteen? Thank you. 
JUDGE MOWER: Mr. Sorenson, these kind of questions 
usually can be cast like this: Mr. Neeleyfs going to 
ask you if he's a good reader or if you're a good 
reader. He's going to ask you to read the words on the 
page. So make sure you listen to his question. He may 
not be asking you to explain it. He may just be asking 
you to read the words on a page. He's going to ask you 
something about them after you've read them. Okay? 
Q: In. light of the question I just asked you with 
your intent on arresting Mr. Worthington to identify 
the box, will you read from the transcript there, 
starting at uh.. 
A: Thirteen? 
Q: Yeah, thirteen. Go ahead and read it out loud. 
A: Read it out loud? Did you, well it says by Mr. 
Neeley, question, did you make a tape recording of the 
conversation had you with Mr. Worthington? Answer, at 
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his home? Question, yes. Answer, no. Did you 
subsequently interview Mr. Worthington after the 
interview at his home? Answer, no. Question, did you 
arrest Mr. Worthington then? Answer, after he 
identified the box saying that was his and saying that 
he did open the box and see the stuff that was in it. 
I told him that I didn't have nay choice, have any 
choice in, I lost my place. 
JUDGE MOWER: (Inaudible). 
A: In the matter, but I was placing him under arrest, 
yes.% 
Q: So, you interviewed him, went there with the 
intent that if he identified the box as being his, you 
were going to arrest him? 
JUDGE MOWER: Well, that's an argumentative question. 
I understand the argument, but I don't want to argue 
with him. You're asking me to conclude that those 
words meant that he went there to arrest him, maybe 
they do, but it's not a fair question for him to 
answer. Don't answer it. Ask another question. 
Q: The uh, Mr. Worthington, when you first asked him 
if he'd identify the box, couldn't identify the box? 
A: Not as I remember, yeah, no not at first he 
didn't. 
Q: And you continued to question him about it? 
A: Yes, sir. 
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Q: That point in time, it became accusatory towards 
Mr. Worthington? 
MR. LYMAN: I don't understand the question of being 
accusatory toward him. 
JUDGE MOWER: The witness says he doesn't understand, 
so ask him another question. 
Q: Did you, did you tell Mr. Worthington that it had 
his name in the box? 
A: I said it had the name Scott. The box, it didn't 
say Scott Worthington, it said Scott. That's why I was 
thexe to find out. 
Q: When you first started the questioning of Mr. 
Worthington, did you tell him why you were there? 
A: I did. 
Q: What did you tell him? 
A: I said I was at Georgia Pacific and found this box 
and that the name Scott was written inside and was here 
to see if it was his box or that he could identify it 
or if he knew anything about it. 
Q: Did you tell him that you had identified and 
tested the contents of the box as containing 
Methamphetamine? 
A: I don't remember if I did or not. I may have. I 
don't recall. 
Q: Why did you (inaudible). Why did you start 
listing off the contents of the box then? 
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A: Basically/ because he didn't know what was inside. 
He said he didn't know what was inside, so I named them 
off to him just to see if he knew anything about them 
at all, 
Q: Is it true that you were trying to elicit from him 
some kind of acknowledgment from him that that was his 
box? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And by questioning him about the contents of the 
box, you tried to elicit some kind of statement? 
A:
 % Yeah, I suppose so. 
Q: And as soon as he said he knew that, you were 
going to arrest him? 
A: Well, if he would have admitted to the stuff being 
his and the box being his, yes, I would have. 
Q: That's all I have. 
JUDGE MOWER: Mr. Lyman, back to you. 
MR. LYMAN: I have no more questions, thank you. 
JUDGE MOWER: Mr. Sorenson, why don't you just leave 
that paper right there. Okay? 
DEPUTY SORENSON: Okay. 
JUDGE MOWER: Thanks a lot. Whose next Mr. Lyman? 
MR. LYMAN: I have no more witnesses. 
JUDGE MOWER: Mr. Neeley? 
MR. NEELEY: I call Mr. Worthington. 
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JUDGE MOWER: Mr. Worthington, would you come up 
please? 
MR. JEFFERY SCOTT WORTHINGTON, BEING DULY SWORN, 
TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF MR. JEFFERY SCOTT WORTHINGTON BY 
MR. NEELEY. 
JUDGE MOWER: Sit there please. 
Q: % State your full name please. 
A: Jeffery Scott Worthington. 
Q: What's your address Mr. Worthington? 
A: 296 West Saturn Road. 









No, it is not. 
Was it in April of uh, was it in January of 1997? 
No, it wasn't. 
Do you recall the day that Mr. Sorenson came to 
residence? 
Yes, I do. 




Sleeping on my couch. 
Did you invite Mr. Sorenson into your home? 
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A: No, I did not. 
Q: When was the first time you knew that Mr. Sorenson 
was in your home? 
A: When he was standing in my front room by my the 
chair that was sitting by the front door. 
Q: Were you asleep at that time? 
A: At the time I was, until I was awoken by my little 
boy. 
Q: Do you recall what the first thing was Mr. 
Sorenson said to you? 
A: Yes, I do, he asked me who I was and if I worked 
at Georgia Pacific and if I'd ever seen this box. And 
I told him yes that's me and yes I do and no I didn't. 
Q: No you didn't? 
A: Yes, no I'd never seen the box. 
Q: Did Mr. Sorenson ever tell you why he was there? 
A: Not that I can recall. 
Q: What's the highest level of education that you've 
completed? 
A: Eleventh grade, but I went and had and took and 
tested my G.E.D. 
Q: Do you have any type of a learning disability? 
A: Yes, I do. I went to two years to the Trade Tech. 
Q: You went to the trade tech? 
A: Yeah, but I never graduated. 
Q: What do you do for a living then? 
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A: Urn, right now Ifve on call for Tri-Star Rentals, 
small engine repair department• They just closed it 
down and now Ifm on call and getting unemployment, 
sometimes. I 
Q: You ever been in jail before this incident, Mr. 
Worthington? 
A: Years ago, for a traffic violation. 
Q: Okay. 
A: And that's it? 
Q: You ever been subjected to any type of police 
interrogation or custodial? 
A: No. | 
Q: Okay, that's all I have right now. 
JUDGE MOWER: Mr. Lyman? 
MR. NEELEY: I have one more thing, Ifm sorry. 
JUDGE MOWER: Thank you. 
Q: Did Mr. Sorenson mirandize, read you your rights; 
That you have a right to remain silent, the right to 
have an attorney present? 
A: After he asked me all sorts of questions. That was 
the only one I can remember. 
Q: All right. Then did he ask you if you wanted to 
talk to him further? 
A: Just, that's when we were walking out and got in 
the car and then headed over to the jail house. 
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Q: Okay, did you tell him you did not want to talk to 
him after he read you your rights? 
A: Yes, I did, and before that. 
Q: When, before that? 
A: Just before he showed me what was inside this box. 
I remember waking up and he opened it up in front of me 
and I told him I want a lawyer and he started showing 
me what was inside this box. 
Q: Thank you. That's all. 
JUDGE MOWER: Mr. Lyman? 
CROSS EXAMINATION OF MR. JEFFERY SCOTT WORTHINGTON 
BY MR. LYMAN 
Q: Just a moment. I'm not quite sure about a time 
uh, that (inaudible) the Court. You said that you told 
him twice that you didn't want to talk to him. 
A: Yeah. 
Q: You just stated that one was right after he showed 
you the box. The other time was after the miranda 
warning. Is that correct? 
A: No. 
Q: What did you just say, ' then? 
A: Once before he started showing me what was in the 
box. The other time was just before we entered the 
gate into the jail house. 
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Q: So, just before he showed you the box, you said "I 
don't want to talk to you." Is that right? 
A: I wanted a lawyer. 
Q: Okay, your wife testified at your preliminary 
hearing, didn't she? 
MR. NEELEY: Your Honor, (inaudible) let me just 
characterize what he said. He didn't say just before, 
he said it, it's when he started showing the contents. 
It's an important statement. 
Q: What did he just say? Okay, I'll ask the question 
again. | 
JUDGE MOWER: Okay, ask him. 
Q: I want to get your answer. Okay now, when did you 
say you didn't want to talk to him? At the time he 
first showed you the box or when he was showing you the 
contents? 
A: The contents. 
Q: The contents? 
A: Yes. 
Q: So, he asked you all the questions about the box 
and you answered them freely? 
A: As far as I know. I don't know. 
Q: What do you mean, you don't know? 
A: I went back to sleep. 
Q: You went to sleep? 
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A: Yes, I fell back asleep. I was sitting on my 
couch. 
Q: Okay now, what time of the day was it? 
A: Morning. 
Q: What time did you get off work? 
A: Seven. 
Q: Uh, was this eight, nine, ten? 
A: I got off work at seven a.m. 
Q: When, when did you talk with Officer Sorenson? 
A: I have no idea. I donft know what time it was. 
It was in the morning. 
Q: It was in the morning. Who was present in the 
room? 
A: My wife, my five year old son and Officer 
Sorenson. 
Q: Okay, your testimony today is that you fell asleep 
during the interview? 
A: Yes. 
Q: How many times did you fall asleep during the 
interview? 
A: I don't know. 
Q: Did you stand up during the interview? 
A: No. 
Q: Was he standing? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Was your wife s t a n d i n g or s i t t i n g ? 
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A: Say that again. 




A: When I first started and shortly after, she 
started to stand and then sat down. 
Q: Okay, were you sitting on the couch? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Was there more than one person sitting on the 
111 couch? 
12 I I A: Yes. 
13 Q: Who else sat on the couch with you? 
14I A: My wife. 
15 Q: Where did she sit? 
A: On my left side. 
._ II Q: Okay, and when did she sit by you? 
A: I don't know when. 
Q: Was it before or after the officer started to 




Q: Did she ever get up during that time? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Who woke you up? 
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My five year old boy. 
And how did he wake you up? 
Remember he jumped on me and said "Daddy wake up." 
What did you do? 
Sat up. 
Did you ever lay back down during the entire time 






Do you always go by the name Scott? 
Yes. 
•The officerfs testified that at some point during 
the interview, you acknowledged that the box was yours, 
Is that correct? 
A: No, I didn't. No, I didn't know if it was drugs 
or not, but I told him first thing no it wasn't mine. 
Q: So, you told him you'd never seen it before? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: The officer said that at some point you said it 





I s i t your s i s t e r ' s box? 
I d o n ' t know. I d o n ' t know where t h a t came from 
because I have no i d e a . 
Q: At any p o i n t d id t h e o f f i c e r t e l l you t h a t any of 
t h e i tems had been" tes tecT ' f or c o n t r o l l e d subs t ance? 
A: No, he d id n o t . 
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Q: Did he ever mention methamphetamine? 
A: Yes, he did. 
Q: Had you taken any methamphetamine within twenty 
four hours? 
MR. NEELEY: Objection, Your Honor, beyond the scope. 
MR. LYMAN: I don't believe it is, Your Honor. 
We've got an individual. 
MR. NEELEY:| You're asking him to incriminate 
himself. 
MR. LYMAN: Your Honor, he's taken the stand 
voluntarily. He's telling us he for some reason fell 
asleep during the interview. I think I can delve into 
what the reasons are he might have fallen asleep during 
the interview. 
JUDGE MOWER: Uh, let me ask you this, Mr. Neeley, I 
think that as a general rule, what the person says in 
questioning can't be used against them later in 
criminal proceedings. Do you agree with me Mr. Neeley? 
MR. NEELEY: Yes. 
JUDGE MOWER: . Do you agree Mr. Lyman? 
MR. LYMAN: If he says anything different at the 
trial, it can be used against him.. 
JUDGE MOWER: How about that Mr. Neeley? 
MR. NEELEY: That's okay with me. Yes, sir. 
JUDGE MOWER: "  Okay, "the"objection1 is overruled.-
Remember the question? 
REBECCA J. HYDE, (435) 673-8204 
781 North Vallev View Drive. #57. St. George. Utah 84770 
29 
MR. NEELEY: Oh, but again, I object (inaudible). 
JUDGE MOWER: Okay. The question is did you use 
iriethamphetamine. Mr. Neeley, you're telling Mr. 
Worthington, don't answer the question. 
Q: The question was did he use it within twenty four 
hours prior to the interview. 
JUDGE MOWER: Okay, you're still instructing him the 
same way? 
MR. NEELEY: What? Uh, yeah, yes. 
JUDGE MOWER: Do you want to follow your lawyer's 
advice and not answer the question? 
A: Yes. 
JUDGE MOWER: He's invoked his Fifth Amendment right. 
Back to you, Mr. Lyman. 
Q: You said you fell asleep during the interview. Do 
you know of any of the reasons why you'd fall asleep 
during the interview other than the fact that you just 
got off graveyard? 
A: No. 
Q: Do you recall how long this interview took? 
A: No. 
Q: Do you recall the officer reading to or telling 
you what was in the box as far as contents? 
A: What do you mean? 
Q: T)o you" recall~the~xrfficer "telling you the-contents 
of the box? 
REBECCA J. HYDE, (435) 673-8204 
781 North Vallev View Drive. #57. St. Georee. Utah 84770 
30 
A: While he was showing it to me? 
Q: Yes, sir. 
A: Yes. I 
i 
Q: Do you recall what he told you was in the box? 
A: That's everything that was in it? 
Q: As many as, what I would like you to do, sir, is 
tell me as many things as you can remember about what 
he said the contents of the box were. 
A: He told me there was a straw, a razor blade, a 
mirror, he said what was a coke spoon and a bag. 
Thatf»s as far as I can remember. 
Q: Okay, did he ask if any of those items were yours? 
A: Yeah, he asked me. 
Q: Did you recognize any of those items as yours? 
A: No, I did not. 
Q: Had you been in the restroom in the Georgia 
Pacific Plant during your shift that morning? 
MR. NEELEY: Your Honor, Ifm going to object to the 
question. It's irrelevant to the issue that's before 
the Court today. That might go to, you know, the case 
achieved when at trial, but what does that have to do 
with (inaudible) issue. The focus is what happened at 
the interrogation. 
JUDGE MOWER: At his house. 
MR. NEELEY: At his house. 
REBECCA J. HYDE, (435) 673-8204 
781 North Vailev View Drive. #57. St. Georee. Utah 84770 
31 
MR. LYMAN: Your Honor, the answer, I don't know 
what his answer is, but the reason for asking the 
question is going to ask him if the officer discussed 
with him whether he went in because he had said that 
the officer told him that it was found at work. I 
wanted to find out how or where or why. I think I can 
get it to that. I don't think it is out of scope. 
MR. NEELEY: What relevance does this have to the 
issue at hand? 
JUDGE MOWER: Well, it apparently, that conversation, 
what he said had been said is at issue here. That's 
what this question is designed to explore. The 
objection is overruled. Mr. Lyman, will you ask the 
question again? 
Q: Had you been in the restroom at the Georgia 
Pacific Plant on the morning of the shift you worked 
before the interview? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did the officer ask you at any point during the 
interview if you had left that box in the restroom? 
A: Not that I remember. 
Q: Do you recall him even mentioning the restroom in 
your discussion with you? 
A: I remember him telling me that it was found in the 
restroom. 
Q: Do you have a sister? 
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A: Which one? 
Q: Do you have a sister, do you have more than one? 
A: Yes, I do. 
Q: How many sisters do you have? 
A; FiveJ 
Q: Okay, do any of them live near here? 
A: One in Cedar City. 
Q: The officer testified that you told him something 
about your sister and the box. Did you tell the 
officer anything about your sister and the box? 
11I A: • No, not anything. 
12 Q: Did the officer, during the interview, at any 
13 point, was he standing up or was he sitting down? 
14 A: Standing. 
15 I Q: How close were you to him when he was standing? 
1 6 A: Probably five feet away. 
Q: Did this interview take more or less than five 
minutes? j 
A: More. 
Q: How much more, sir? 
A: I donft know. 
Q: At any point during the interview, did he do 
anything such as pull his gun out, take his handcuffs 
out, or do anything like that that would indicate to 
your that you were about to lose your freedom? 
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JUDGE MOWER: No, hefs not asking that, but I'm going 
to ask you to repeat the question. 
Q: Let me ask him a rephrase. At any point during 
the interview, did the officer pull his gun out of his 
holster? 
A: No. 
Q: Did he take his handcuffs off his belt? 
A: No. 
Q: Did he do anything else to indicate to you that 
you were about to be physically restrained? 
A: Not that I remember. 
Q: I have no more questions. 
JUDGE MOWER: Back to you Mr. Neeley. 
MR. NEELEY: I have no more questions. 
JUDGE MOWER: Mr. Worthington, thank you very much. 
Mr. Neeley, who's next? 
MR. NEELEY: That's it. 
JUDGE MOWER: Back to you Mr. Lyman. 
MR. LYMAN: We have no rebuttal. I believe it's his 
Motion. I would just as soon do brief argument now and 
hopefully. 
JUDGE MOWER: Mr. Neeley, it's your Motion so I'm just 
going to start asking you questions. You're saying 
that the officer did not have enough information to 
take him to 296-West-Saturn-on-the morning of January 
6, 1997? 
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MR. NEELEY: We1re saying just the opposite. We1re 
saying that the officer had thoroughly investigated. 
That he learned that there was only one person named 
Scott at the plant. He knew that there was 
methamphetamine in the box. He knew that Mr. 
Worthington had worked that night shift and he also 
knew where he lived because that's from Georgia 
Pacific. He didnft go to any other employees. At that 
point in time, the investigation was totally focused on 
Mr. Worthington excluding all others, okay? And that's 
whythe went there. He went there for the express 
purpose to try to elicit from Mr. Worthington 
acknowledgment that he knew or saw the box. 
JUDGE MOWER: Why would focusing on the one person 
make the difference? 
MR. NEELEY: Why? 
JUDGE MOWER: Uh huh. 
MR. NEELEY: Because that's the standard of our 
Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court itself. When the 
Court is focused on, was focusing interrogation. 
JUDGE MOWER: So, Mr. Sorenson did something he 
shouldn't have done during the interrogation. That was 
he failed to advise the Defendant of his rights? 
MR. NEELEY: Right. If he would have advised him of 
his rights, we wouldn't be here right now. 
REBECCA J. HYDE, (435) 673-8204 
781 North Vallev View Drive. #57. St. Georce. Utah 84770 
35 
JUDGE MOWER: So, when Mr. Sorenson walked in and sat 
down in the chair, if he would have said to Mr. 
Worthington "You have the rights to remain silent, 
anything you say can and will be used against you in 
the Court of law. You have the right to talk to a 
lawyer." If he had read him that before he read him 
his questions, we would not be here today? 
MR. NEELEY: We would not be here today. We would 
not be here. And we know that because as soon as he 
read him his rights, he wouldn't talk to him anymore. 
The,officer said that and that's what he said. 
JUDGE MOWER: You1re also saying that in spite of the 
differences between what the officer said and what the 
Defendant said, there is no difference as to the 
advising of the rights? 
MR. NEELEY: Right. 
JUDGE MOWER: The officer said "I didn't give him his 
rights until we were out to the car or close to the 
car" and Mr. Worthington said "he didn't read me my 
rights until we were on our way out to the car." 
MR. NEELEY: Right. 
JUDGE MOWER: And with that claim, you're saying I've 
got to suppress all of the statements Mr. Worthington 
made at all because all of them were made before he was 
advised of his rights? 
MR. NEELEY: That is correct. 
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JUDGE MOWER: And it's the focusing in that makes the 
difference? 
MR. NEELEY: Well, there's a number of different 
factors. He had to take custody and there has to be 
interrogation. That's the standard setting if I'm 
right. And our Court has defined 
JUDGE MOWER: What that means. 
MR. NEELEY: What that means. And they have defined 
it as meaning that they focused, decided on 
interrogation and we have a couple of Utah cases that 
are ^really kind of close to point in that they went 
into a person's home, (inaudible). They went into a 
person's home at four a.m. in the morning, woke him out 
of bed and interrogated him. They found that to be a 
custodial environment. Okay? Because it could be, and 
then the question is accusatory too. But they found 
that to be an environment that was custodial and they 
suppressed any statements that were made. Now there's 
another case that we have where they went to a person's 
home and he invited him in and talked to him. And of 
course, that's not custodial environment and we're not 
going to express those feelings that he voluntarily let 
him into the home. I think the way it all went down is 
that he was asleep. He had just woken up to find the 
officer in his front room. I think that makes a great 
deal of difference. He didn't invite him in and he was 
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immediately confronted with the questions about the 
box. 
JUDGE MOWER: But another adult household member 
invited him in. 
MR. NEELEY: A child invited him in, a five-year old, 
Then he was met by the wife. 
JUDGE MOWER: I thought the officer said the boy 
opened the door, then the wife came. The officer said 
"Can I speak with Mr. Worthington?" She said "yes, 
come in.fl 
MR., NEELEY: Right. 
JUDGE MOWER: Why shouldn't I ascribe that conduct of 
the Defendant? He was invited in, the officer was 
invited in, so itfs not custodial. 
MR. NEELEY: He was not invited in by the Defendant. 
Itfs just like if you go to the police station 
voluntarily to present yourself there to answer 
questions. He didn't voluntarily present himself to 
that type of interrogation. And, if Mr. Sorenson had 
told Mr. Worthington why he was there investigating a 
possession of methamphetamine and been up front with 
him. The response might have been something different. 
Go and get an arrest warrant. 
JUDGE MOWER: How do you know that? That's just 
speculation. 
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MR. NEELEY: We donft, but the burden is on them to 
prove it. The burden is on them, not on us. The 
burden is on them to prove that they did what needed to 
be done. And they did violate his Fourteenth Amend.., 
Sixth Amendment rights. 
JUDGE MOWER: I don't think so. 
MR. NEELEY: The other factors presented, Your Honor, 
is the type of accusatory, or, the type of questions 
that occurred. He denied it and Mr. Sorenson, Officer 
Sorenson, kept at it. Asked him if he had seen the box 
and*he said he'd denied it. Then he started listing 
the items. Um, one of the things that's very important 
et. Miriquette, and that's the recent Utah Supreme 
Court, did very thoroughly. I think it's about a 
twenty three page decision of our Supreme Court that 
talks about miranda and those kind of things. One of 
the things that I'm going to quote it from in a U.S. 
Supreme Court case says that if the officer, if a 
person is in custody an he finds that he is in custody 
and the officer is questioning or its functional 
equivalent, the officer knew the response was likely to 
elicit an incriminating statement, then there should 
have been a benefit of miranda. That's exactly what we 
have here. An officer is there, present in his home, 
he had just woken up, he starts questioning, he makes a 
denial and then he continues to question him further. 
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We know that the officer, as soon as he identified that 
box, was going to arrest him because that's what he 
did. Ke identified the box and then he arrested him. 
But he had to continue to question him about the 
contents of the box and all that was going on. In that 
respect. Your Honor/ I think it requires suppression of 
the statements. The other thing the Court should focus 
on also is the sophistication of the Defendant and what 
his perception is. The background he has, whether or 
not he's had. And there's a whole bunch of cases that 
taljc about whether or not there ?ve been prior arrests 
and prior interrogations, prior convictions and things 
like that. In this instance, we don't have a 
sophisticated Defendant who's been through the system. 
Nor does he have experience with that. He says he's 
never been interrogated before. So, I think all those 
things, Your Honor, the most important case, and I 
think the case that's on point for Utah, according to 
Utah Law is Salt Lake City versus Carter. And we want 
to ask the Court to look at that case in particular in 
making a decision here. It sets forth the facts that 
our Supreme Court thinks are important in this kind of 
a case. 
JUDGE MOWER: Mr. Lyman, over to you. 
MR. LYMAN: Your Honor, it's real interesting that 
now Mr. Neeleyfs called the clients. He wants to rely 
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solely on the testimony of the Sheriff's deputy. He 
says that he wants to argue that as this interview went 
on and Mr. Worthington began admitting the things, that 
all of his admissions should be thrown out. I was 
quite careful to go through. Ke didn't admit anything. 
As you recall, I went through everything. Mr. 
Worthington never admitted it was his box, that he had 
any idea whose box it was. He never admitted that he 
was in the restroom, he never admitted it's contents. 
Mr. Worthington never admitted a thing. But, in the 
argument, Mr. Neeley continually points up and says 
"Now as the officer got those admissions", Okay, it got 
more and more accusatory. Well, now you gotta make a 
chioce. You've got a Defendant here who's telling one 
story that if you believe the story, there is 
absolutely no admission by him of any criminal conduct 
whatsoever during this interview. Now, that's the 
reason why Mr. Neeley continues to go with the deputy's 
version of what happened, which is probably a bit more 
truthful version of what happened, because as the 
questioning went on, Mr. Worthington says "yeah, that's 
my box," okay, "but my sister had it" or "I was 
supposed to get her", some bogus story comes forward. 
He, Mr. Neeley, would like us to believe that when you 
ask the question "Do you know what's in the box?" and 
he says no, that's all you can ask because if you ask 
REBECCA J. HYDE, (435) 673-8204 
781 North Vallev View Drive. #57. St. Georee. Utah 84770 
4 «» 
4 JL 
anything else, suddenly you're not interrogating, 
you're accusing. And all the deputy said he did was 
said "Well, do you know what's in the box?" and he said 
no. I went through each of the items and asked if he 
recognized any of the items. At no point do we get to 
an accusatory level. Mr. Neeley's brief is fine, he's 
covered the basic points. He's simply off target on 
this particular case. If you believe Mr. Worthington's 
testimony, the deputy had nothing more except denial 
from the time he walked in that door to the time he 
walked out that door, but he had sufficient at that 
point to do an arrest. If you believed the deputy's 
statements, then he went to the house he's, just as you 
stated, the young boy comes to the door. The mother 
invites him in. She knows her husband's asleep on the 
couch. She invites the deputy in. The boy wakes the 
deputy the, Mr. worthington up. Mr. Worthington sits 
up. Questions are exchanged. Mr. worthington 
testifies wife sits down by him. He promptly falls 
asleep, or at least during his questioning, falls 
asleep. Okay, now miranda was felt and our supreme 
Court recognizes, the purpose is to stop officers from 
taking advantage over people in custodial situations, 
if you are so comfortable in this interview that you 
can fall asleep in the middle of the interview, I 
venture to guess there wasn't a lot of pressure by 
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Officer Sorenson. There was not a custodial or 
accusatory environment because had there been either a 
custodial or accusatory environment, Mr. Worthington 
wouldn't have fallen asleep in the middle of the 
interview. Now, it is a real stretch to claim, as Mr. 
Worthington wants to, that as soon as he was asked any 
questions about the box, that he wanted a lawyer and 
wanted the questioning to stop. His wife never said 
that in the preliminary hearing. He never, the officer 
never said that. It's just made out of (inaudible). 
But*at some point, these questions went on. What it 
boils down to, Your Honor, is decided interrogation. 
He's at the house. He's invited in. The officer said 
that he went there and he went there to investigate. 
He was the prime suspect, but just because you're the 
prime suspect does not mean that you have to have your 
miranda rights read. If he would have gone in and 
immediately been up front and said it's not my box or I 
lost it six months ago or something, fine. Then the 
officer could have gone that way. Instead, what the 
officer got was a set of admissions. 
JUDGE MOWER: So, what you're saying is that if you're 
the prime suspect and you're in custody, that triggers 
miranda? 
MR. LYMAN: Yeah, the custody is the key. 
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JUDGE MOWER: if you're the prime suspect and not in 
MR. LYMAN: Yrou can be the focus of what that 
officer's investigating okay. And that's the way they 
have to do it. I would dare say that the time that the 
cop who stops you on the road after reading an eighty 
five in a seventy five, eighty five on his radar, when 
he walks up and asks you "How fast were you going?", 
you're probably the prime suspect, but that question, 
the answer to that question is entirely admissible. 
You Ire the focus of that investigation too, when you're 
standing there and the officer says, "How fast do you 
think you were going, sir?" Okay? I mean, what Mr. 
Neeley is missing is that there, all of these have got 
to come together. This was a mere investigation. It 
wasn't an accusatory. All right, I'm going to get you 
now, let's take the brass knuckles out and work you 
over. What, we asked the questions, did he pull out a 
gun, did he do his handcuffs, did he do, no he didn't 
do any of that. The interview was brief. No one knows 
exactly how long it went, but it's obvious the 
interview went short, went short because there was 
almost nothing from either version that was gathered 
from this, from this interview. The bottom line was, 
the officer testifies he went there, looked like this 
was the guy that probably knew something about it. He 
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went there. The purpose of asking questions. Yeah, 
hefs the suspect. And we don't deny that he was the 
suspect just as the driver of the car is a suspect when 
the officer's got the radar on him. Okay? But is 
doesn't mean that just because you're a suspect, and 
you may be the prime suspect, that you have to have 
your miranda rights read for you, all right? In this 
case, there was no accusatory investigation. There was 
no lengthy interrogation that would cause you to cave 
in and suddenly give in just so you could get out of 
beipg beaten to death by this officer verbally so that 
you could have to cave in and give false statements. 
The place of the interrogation was freely invited in 
there. His wife sat there while the interview 
occurred. I think Mr. Neeley singled out the mark by 
this one. Anything that was said by Mr. Worthington 
should be admissible at the trial. That's the whole 
point. We don't disagree with his outline of law. 
He's done a very good job with the law. I think his 
conclusions are not in keeping with what the law is. 
We argue that he should be denied the Motion, sir. 
JUDGE MOWER: Mr. Neeley, you're saying that there's a 
recent appeal, but your cite is State versus Carter and 
I looked at your cite in the Memo. It says 1983. That 
doesn't qualify as recent. 
MR. NEELEY: Well, Miriquette, Your Honor, is uh. 
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JUDGE MOWER: 92, That's the one that you're saying 
is the more recent case? 
MR. NEELEY: In that case, it's a very long opinion 
and the Court goes through, uh, in fact it's a 
(inaudible). But they go though the standards set in 
Utah for miranda. The other thing, that's important-
Your Honor, you know, we cite a couple of federal cases 
in our Brief that the counsel just wants to gloss over, 
State versus, or Resident versus Arizona, is an 81 
case* It's a federal case none the less and the Courts 
found that the interrogation of the Defendant without 
having been mirandized was improper and excluded the 
evidence simply when they put a recorded statement in 
front of him that implicated him. They found that was 
interrogation accusatory. The other federal case we 
cite, People versus Ferrerez, 1984 case, the Court 
found that interrogation was taking place when the 
police placed some (inaudible) on the Defendant's side 
in front of his jail cell. And they didn't even talk 
to him, they just put it there. They found that to be 
interrogation. So... 
JUDGE MOWER: Well, I think I can make the judgment of 
interrogation, but I guess I've got to question about 
this custody status. Mr. Worthington in custody under 
the circumstances. You're saying that he was, because 
all the circumstances, lead to conclude that he's got a 
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policeman who, at least according to Mr. Worthington, 
uninvited, so it places it under the category of being 
custodial. Right? 
MR. NEELEY: Right, and there's five factors our 
Court has identified for that. I can list those for 
the Court. The cite of the interrogation. If it is in 
the police station, then you presume that it's 
custodial, but then we quote Sate vs. Carter, some of 
9
 those other cases where it occurred right in the 
10 Defendant's home. And the Texas case where it occurred 
11 in the Defendant's home at six a.m. and it woke him up. 
12 The Court found that was custodial. Okay? So the 
13 presumption is that the area that is as strong in this 
14 case is that it is in the other cases. Whether the 
25 investigation focused on the accused, I don't think. I 
1 6 think that's a given. He's the only one that Officer 
Sorenson... 
JUDGE MOWER: At least five factors I'm going to read 
about in these papers is Miriquette. 
MR. NEELEY: Well, you see it in State versus Carter 
and then they to, Miriquette talks about it, yes. 
JUDGE MOWER: What's the other two factors? 
MR. NEELEY: Whether the objective adicia of arrest 
were present and we talked about that in our break. 
The form of interrogation, whether the Defendant came 
to the place of interrogation freely and willingly. 
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the box, he had ownership of the box. No matter how he 
answered that, that's going to be incriminating. Ke 
said no, that wasn't good enough for Officer Sorenson. 
He continued to question him about that. 
JUDGE MOWER: So, it? not the answer that he gave 
that's the focus of your Motion? Your saying that when 
Officer Sorenson walked in the door, he should have 
given miranda and he didn't, and that's the 
circumstance you want me to focus on? 
MR. NEELEY: It is. And I think the Court can take a 
middle position on this regard too. There's a point in 
the whole scenario if Mr. Worthington, see the other 
thing is in the transcript. We had Mrs. Worthington 
testify in the preliminary hearing. And she testified 
exactly as Mr. Worthington had. The purpose of 
miranda, Your Honor, is to protect the people's 
constitutional rights, without giving terminating 
statements against him, without being advised of those 
rights. And her testimony is exactly as Mr. 
Worthington's. If you allow the officers to go on the 
stand and rebut them, those statements. 
JUDGE MOWER: I'd like to read the statements of 
Miriquette, State versus Carter, and those cases. I'd 
like to also, like to read the transcript of the 
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preliminary hearing. So, your federal cases that 
you've cited, you haven't given me copies and I didn't 
have access to those. 
MR. NEELEY: I would be willing to do that, Your 
Honor. 
JUDGE MOWER: I would recommend that you send me 
copies of it. I'll take the decision of this case 
under advisement and issue you a statement. Will you 
make a note to read the transcript of that case that 
Mr. Neeley has cited in his Memorandum? Thank you Mr. 
Sorpnson, Mr. Worthington. I think we're probably done 
with your case. Thanks for being here. 
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